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PROHIBITION AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: A NEW LOOK AT
SOME OLD CASES
KENNETH M. MURCHISON*
The effort to ban alcoholic beverages has received significant atten-
tion from American historians, especially in the last two decades. Much
of the historiography has focused on the question of defining the nature
of the prohibition movement, that is, determining whether it was a pro-
gressive social reform, as the enactment of the eighteenth amendment'
at the end of the Progressive Era indicates,2 or whether it was really a
pseudo-reform, as its repeal3 by the New Deal administration 4 suggests.
* Associate Professor, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. M.A.,
University of Virginia, 1975; J.D., University of Virginia, 1972; B.A., Louisiana Polytechnic
Institute, 1969.
This article is an edited version of one chapter of the author's S.J.D. dissertation at
Harvard Law School. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Morton
Horwitz for his critiques of earlier drafts of the manuscript.
I U.S. CoNST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (repealed 1933): "After one year from the ratification
of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the im-
portation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory
subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited."
2 See C. CHAMBERS, SEEDTIME OF REFORM 76 (1963) (including the Women's Christian
Temperance Union as one of the groups that could be called out to support progressive causes
during the 1920s); R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, 290-91 (1967) (indicating
the factual evidence available to support prohibition). Cf. J. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE:
STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1963) (interpreting prohi-
bition as a conflict over status between a traditional America centered in rural, middle-class,
Protestant values and a modem America identified with cosmopolitan, urban, and immigrant
values). See general4' N. CLARK, DELIVER US FROM EVIL: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERI-
CAN PROHIBITION 10 (1976); J. TIMBERLAKE, PROHIBITION AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVE-
MENT, 1900-1920pasim (1963).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1: "The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States is hereby repealed."
4 See, e.g., R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955); see general.y A. SINCLAIR, PRO-
HIBITION: THE ERA OF ExcESs passim (1962) (interpreting prohibition as exemplary of an
American tendency to excessive moralism). Scholars who interpret prohibition as a pseudo-
reform tend to treat the patriotism associated with the World War I mobilization effort as an
important factor in producing the eighteenth amendment. E.g., id at 20; R. HOFSTADTER,
supra at 290; cf. C. MERz, THE DRY DECADE 25 (1931) ("The war did three things for prohi-
bition. It centralized authority in Washington; it stressed the importance of saving food; and
it outlawed all things German.") But see H. ASBURY, THE GREAT ILLUSION: AN INFORMAL
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Other analysts, however, have tried to go beyond this preliminary ques-
tion to explain how the "noble experiment" of prohibition influenced
American life and habits. Their studies have identified a variety of ef-
fects, from encouraging single-issue pressure groups,5 to discrediting
moderate attempts to promote temperance,6 to discouraging proposals
for governmental regulation of the personal lives of American citizens.
7
This article explores an aspect of prohibition's influence that has been
largely ignored: the impact of the Prohibition Amendment on Ameri-
can law.8
Even a cursory glance indicates that the eighteenth amendment's
impact on the court system and legal thought was significant. Prohibi-
tion drastically increased the caseloads of federal courts and ushered in a
widespread system of plea bargaining.9 Its enforcement filled the fed-
eral government's antiquated prisons and stimulated construction of
new penal facilities.' 0 - The flood of prohibition decisions required law-
yers to integrate the eighteenth amendment into existing law, by creat-
ing new doctrines'" and stimulating the refinement of relatively
HISTORY OF PROHIBITION 136 (1950) ("At most the war may have hastened ratification by a
few years."). For relatively balanced assessments of the war's impact on the adoption of the
eighteenth amendment by a contemporary observer and a modern scholar, see P. ODEGARD,
PRESSURE POLITICS: THE STORY OF THE ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE 78 (1928); N. CLARK, supra
note 2, at 122-30.
5 P. ODEGARD, supra note 4, passim.
6 A. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 28; cf. D. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 201
(1979) ("Organized opponents of national prohibition showed concern for creating a temper-
ate society and establishing more effective control over the liquor traffic, but they foreclosed
certain approaches to a solution. . . . [Trhey rejected a compromise often suggested during
the 1920s, that is, modification of prohibition to allow beer and wine while continuing to
outlaw more potent distilled spirits. . . . Furthermore, by their opposition to federal solu-
tions, the wets bear, willingly of course, considerable responsibility for the fragmented pattern
of liquor control which emerged in the United States after repeal.').
7 D. KYVIG, supra note 6, at 199-200.
8 One illustration of the failure of general historians to recognize the significance of pro-
hibition's impact on American legal thought should suffice to illustrate the point. David
Kyvig's 1979 study of the repeal movement refers to Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928), as "[t]he last major Supreme Court decision concerning prohibition enforcement." Id
at 34.
9 NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE EN-
FORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 55-56 (1931) [hereinafter
referred to as PROHIBITION ENFORCEMENT REPORT]. See also H. ASBURY, supra note 4, at
168-73; H. JOHNSTON, WHAT RIGHTS ARE LEFT? 57 (1930); D. KYVIG, supra note 6, at 29-30,
108; C. MERZ, supra note 4, at 303; A. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 211.
10 D. KYVIG, supra note 6, at 30, 108; PROHIBITION ENFORCEMENT REPORT, suPra note 9,
at 58; A. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 212; M. TILLIT, THE PRICE OF PROHIBITION 53-54 (1932).
11 See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (entrapment); National Prohibi-
tion Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920) (concurrent jurisdiction). On the development of the entrap-
ment defense, see generally Murchison, The Entrapment Defense in Federal Courts: Emergence of a




This article analyzes prohibition's impact on American legal
thought by examining the extent to which prohibition influenced the
development of fourth amendment doctrines.' 3 The analysis includes
five parts: a survey of the history of prohibition and the Supreme
Court's prohibition cases; a description of the state of fourth amendment
doctrine at the beginning of the prohibition era; a discussion of the doc-
trinal changes that occurred during the thirteen years of national prohi-
bition; a review of the state of fourth amendment doctrine at the end of
the prohibition era; and, finally, an evaluation of the significance of pro-
hibition as a force in the doctrinal developments.
I. THE BACKGROUND MILIEU
Like many reform movements in the United States, the organized
effort to suppress alcoholic beverages began in the early 1800s. 14 Al-
though this early prohibition activity focused primarily on voluntary
abstinence, a number of states enacted prohibitory legislation during the
1850s.15 As was true with other reform movements of the nineteenth
century, the prohibition movement was eventually dwarfed by the anti-
slavery movement. By 1869, only three states retained statewide
prohibition.16
Prohibition reappeared as a significant political force roughly con-
temporaneously with the emergence of the populist movement in the
late nineteenth century. In a second wave of state prohibition, several
states enacted new statutes forbidding the manufacture, sale, and trans-
portation of intoxicating liquors. This second wave also receded, how-
ever, and in 1893 the number of states with prohibition statutes again
12 For examples other than those discussed in the text, see Richbourg Motor Co. v. United
States, 281 U.S. 528 (1930) (forefeiture of automobiles); Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494
(1926) (self-incrimination); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (double jeopardy).
13 The larger study of which this article forms a part involves a general evaluation of
prohibition's impact on criminal law doctrines used by the federal courts. An earlier article
documented the rise of the defense of entrapment during the prohibition era. See Murchison,
supra note 11.
14 No organized prohibition movement existed in colonial America. Indeed, "even the
immoderate use of liquors was common at church functions and especially at weddings,
church councils, and funerals," E. CHERRINGTON, THE EvoLUTION OF PROHIBITION IN THE
UNITED STATES 14 (1969 reprint). See a/so H. ASBURY, supa note 4, at 3. For a recent at-
tempt to explain the rise of the temperance movement in the early part of the nineteenth
century, see W. RORABAUGH, THE ALCOHOLIC REPUBLIC: AN AMERICAN TRADITION (1979).
15 N. CLARK, supira note 2, at 45.
16 E. CHERRINGTON, supra note 14, at 39-46, 89-96, 135-45. Several students of the prohi-
bition movement have observed that leaders of the early prohibition effort also tended to be
leaders in the anti-slavery movement. Id at 145; N. CLARK, THE DRY YEARS: PROHIBITION
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN WAsHINGTON 64-66 (1965); W. RORABAUGH, stmpra note 14, at 37,
214-15.
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dropped to three. 17
In the 1890s, a new group, the Anti-Saloon League, emerged to
direct the political campaign of the prohibitionists. Is Unswervingly
committed to prohibition,' 9 but always practical in working out tac-
tics, 20 the Anti-Saloon League secured the enactment of prohibitory
laws in twenty-six states and the passage of a federal statute forbidding
the transportation of intoxicating liquor into a state in violation of state
law. The League also led the successful battle for national prohibition,
first seizing on patriotic fervor to secure enactment of wartime prohibi-
tion and then persuading Congress to propose the eighteenth amend-
ment and the states to ratify it approximately thirteen months after its
submission.
21
Ultimately, however, national prohibition proved to be an experi-
ment that failed, for the eighteenth amendment remained in effect for
only thirteen years. 22 In the first half of the 1920s national prohibition
seemed to enjoy a significant amount of public support. Various bits of
evidence confirm that prohibition was initially popular with the Ameri-
can people: the rapid ratification of the eighteenth amendment, 23 the
overwhelmingly favorable margin of the ratification vote in the state
17 E. CHERRINGTON, supra note 14, at 170-71, 249.
18 C. MERZ, supra note 4, at 9-10. See general'y E. CHERRINGTON, THE STORY OF THE
ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE passim (1910); P. ODEGARD, supra note 4, passim.
19 See P. ODEGARD, supra note 4, at 79, 85-86. The Anti-Saloon League was willing to
overlook personal indiscretions of legislators who voted for their position. See H. ASBURY,
supra note 4, at 182 ("[O]ne congressman served a term in prison for accepting a bribe of five
thousand dollars in a case involving the withdrawal of four thousand cases of whiskey in
Pittsburgh. When he was released he ran for re-election and was supported by the Anti-
Saloon League; he had always voted dry.").
20 H. ASBURY, supra note 4, at 131-32; E. CHERRINGTON, supra note 14, at 278; N. CLARK,
supra note 2, at 98; N. CLARK, supra note 16, at 82; V. DABNEY, DRY MESSIAH: THE LIFE OF
BISHOP CANNON 58 (1949). One early manifestation of this practicality was the choice of the
group's name. See P. ODEGARD, supra note 4, at 38:
The very name Anti-Saloon League was chosen to focus interest on the institution which
was the fountain of the poisonous product which the "Pledgers" shunned and the [Wo-
men's Christian Temperance Union] would outlaw. Moderate drinkers and total ab-
stainers, who balked at the ideal of absolute prohibition, were willing to admit that the
American saloon had become a noisome thing.
See also H. ASBURY, supra note 4, at 112; H. FELDMAN, PROHIBITION: ITS ECONOMIC AND
INDUSTRIAL ASPECTS 379 (1927).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933); H. ASBURY, Supra note 4, at 94-100; V.
DABNEY, supra note 20, at 123; C. MERZ, supra note 4, at 8-17, 25-47. For a summary of the
accomplishments of the prohibition movement at the state and local levels, see E. CHER-
RINGTON, supra note 14, at 254-55, 319-20. On the significance of the Webb-Kenyon Act,
which prohibited interstate transportation of intoxicating liquors in violation of state law, see
A. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 154.
22 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. For the text of the amendment, see supa note 3.
23 E. CHERRINGTON, supra note 14, at 329-30; D. KYvIG, supira note 6, at 12; C. MERZ,
supra note 4, at 39-42.
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legislatures, 24 the prompt passage of the relatively strict Volstead Act
(officially known as the National Prohibition Act) by which Congress
implemented its power to enforce the eighteenth amendment, 25 and the
growth in the number of prohibition supporters in the congressional
elections following adoption of the eighteenth amendment.
26
By 1926, organized opposition to prohibition had begun to develop
and to call for modification or repeal of the existing law.27 The new
opposition was not strong enough to thwart the prohibition leadership,
however.28 As the passage of the Jones Act 29 in 1929 illustrates, prohibi-
tionists continued to dominate the political scene. The Jones Act re-
fined the sentencing policy of the Volstead Act to encourage leniency for
youthful and casual offenders while actually increasing penalties for
multiple offenders and those who were habitually involved in the liquor
traffic.
Early in the 1930s, prohibition opponents gained strength.30 After
the 1929 crash, supporters of prohibition were increasingly isolated, and
24 V. DABNEY, supra note 20, at 132 ("Every state except Rhode Island and Connecticut
ultimately ratified Fedeial prohibition, and more than eighty percent of the members of the
forty-six ratifying legislatures voted in the affirmative.' See also E. CHERRINGTON, supra note
14, at 330-31. Opponents of prohibition discounted the overwhelmingly favorable vote on
ratification as further evidence of the influence of war hysteria. C. MERZ, supa note 4, at 42-
43.
25 Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 1935). For a summary of the congres-
sional action, see C. MERZ, supra note 4, at 48-50.
26 I. FISHER & H. BROUGHAM, PROHIBITION STILL AT ITS WORST 231-32 (1928). At
least one commentator argued, however, that some of those counted as prohibition supporters
had only a limited commitment to the dry cause. C. MERZ, supra note 4, at 188-90.
27 H. ASBURY, supra note 4, at 328-31; C. MERZ, supra note 4, at 208-32; A. SINCLAIR,
supra note 4, at 335. Prohibition supporters responded to this criticism by arguing that prohi-
bition had improved the American economy. See, e.g., H. FELDMAN, supa note 20, passim; I.
FISHER & H. BROUGHAM, supra note 26,pfassim. For a brief summary of some of the rhetori-
cal excesses of both sides, see C. MERZ, supra note 4, at 158-62.
28 Most scholars, for example, agree that prohibition was a factor in the defeat of Al
Smith in the presidential election of 1928, especially in the South. See, e.g., W.
LEUCHTENBURG, THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY, 1914-32 235 (1958).
29 Pub. L. No. 70-899, 45 Stat. 1446 (1929) (repealed 1935),.provides in pertinent part:
[w]herever a penalty or penalties are prescribed in a criminal prosecution by the Na-
tional Prohibition Act, as amended and supplemented, for the illegal manufacture, sale,
transportation, importation, or exportation of intoxicating liquor, as defined by section
1, Title II, of the National Prohibition Act, the penalty imposed for each such offense
shall be a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed five years, or both:
Provided, That it is the intent of Congress that the court, in imposing sentence hereunder,
should discriminate between causal or slight violations and habitual sales of intoxicating
liquor, or attempts to commercialize violations of the law.
See C. MERZ, supra note 4, at 233.
3O Most observers agree that support for prohibition had eroded substantially by the end
of the decade. See, e.g., C. CHAMBERS, supra note 2, at 234; N. CLARK, supra note 16, at 206-
17; M. TILLIT, supra note 10, at 3-9. Despite this erosion, repeal was not a foregone conclu-
sion even for opponents of prohibition. See F. BLACK, ILL-STARRED PROHIBITION CASES 149
(1931).
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opponents now argued that repeal would create jobs as well as protect
personal liberty.3 1 In fact, a leading historian of the New Deal reports
that the biggest ovation at the Democratic Convention of 1932 came at
the reading of the plank advocating repeal of the eighteenth amend-
ment.3 2 After the election, the lameduck Congress that met in Decem-
ber of 1932 submitted the repeal amendment without waiting for the
new Democratic administration.3 3 Acting in special conventions elected
solely to consider repeal, the states ratified the twenty-first amendment
even more rapidly than they had ratified the eighteenth.
3 4
The pattern of Supreme Court decisions in prohibition cases paral-
lels the three stages of political debate over prohibition-strong initial
support, gradual growth of doubts, and eventual repudiation. During
the early years of national prohibition, Supreme Court decisions re-
jected attacks on the new amendment and the law implementing it3
5
and were nearly uniform in strengthening the power of state and federal
prosecutors.3 6 Typical of the decisions were those upholding Congress'
31 H. ASBURY, suira note 4, at 328-3 1; D. KYVIG, supra note 6, at 116, 131; 6( N. CLARK,
supra note 16, at 234-35 (correlation in the state of Washington of votes for repeal and votes
for Hoover). For an anti-prohibition work emphasizing the economic issue, see C.
WARBURTON, THE ECONOMIC RESULTS OF PROHIBITION (1932).
32 A. SCHLESINGER, THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER, 1919-1933 302 (1957).
33 SJ. Res. 211, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., 47 Stat. 1625 (1933) (ratified as U.S. CONST. amend.
XXI). One of the new Democratic Congress' first actions was to amend the Volstead Act to
permit the sale of light beers and wines even before the twenty-first amendment had been
ratified. Pub. L. No. 73-3, 48 Stat. 16 (1933) (repealed in part, 1935).
34 See generally D. KYVIG, sufira note 6, at 169-82; U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, RATIFICATION OF
THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1934).
35 Heitler v. United States, 260 U.S. 438 (1923); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921);
National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920). See also Rainier Brewing Co. v. Great
Northern Pac. S.S. Co., 259 U.S. 150 (1922) (construction of the Webb-Kenyon Act to forbid
transportation of intoxicating liquor except in accordance with state permit requirements);
Williams v. United States, 255 U.S. 336 (1921) (upholding the validity of the Webb-Kenyon
Act). Near the end of the prohibition era, the Supreme Court also rejected a challenge to the
method of ratifying the eighteenth amendment. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716
(1931); cf Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (rejection of a challenge to the nineteenth
amendment, which granted women the right to vote).
36 For examples in addition to those referred to in the text, see Druggan v. Anderson, 269
U.S. 36 (1925) (ruling that the eighteenth amendment authorized the federal government to
regulate the sale of intoxicating liquor and to pass the Volstead Act prior to the effective date
of the amendment); Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925) (upholding a state law that
banned mere possession of intoxicating liquor); United States v. Valante, 264 U.S. 563 (1924)
(refusing to allow objections to the judge's sentencing authority to be raised by writ of habeas
corpus); Wyman v. United States, 263 U.S. 14 (1923); Brede v. Powers, 263 U.S. 4 (1923)
(allowing federal prosecutors to use informations rather than indictments to charge misde-
meanors under the Volstead Act); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) (construing
the Volstead Act to cover intoxicating liquor kept as part of a ship's store); United States v.
Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (holding that federal and state governments could prosecute a
defendant for the same act without violating the constitutional prohibition against double
joepardy).
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power to levy a tax on the intoxicating !iquors that the Act had made it
illegal to produce;3 7 sustaining a Georgia law establishing a presump-
tion that persons who occupied real property on which a distilling appa-
ratus was found knew of its existence;3 8 and construing the eighteenth
amendment and the Volstead Act to supersede an existing treaty with
Great Britain and to forbid the transportation through the United
States of liquor going from Canada to a third country.
3 9
The occasional exceptions to this general pattern in the early years
of national prohibition usually involved the protection of existing prop-
erty rights. For example, the Court construed the Volstead Act to per-
mit an individual to store liquor owned prior to the effective date of the
Act,40 and it required a hearing before the taxes and penalties imposed
by the Act could be collected.4'
In the middle 1920s, the dominant theme of the Supreme Court's
opinions was a continuing willingness to allow both state and federal
governments broad authority to enforce prohibition.42 For example, the
37 United States v. Yuginovich, 265 U.S. 450 (1921); cf. Vigliotti v. Pennsylvania, 258
U.S. 403 (1922) (upholding the continued validity of a state liquor license law after passage of
national prohibition).
38 Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922). Congress never established such a presumption in
the federal enforcement statute. The lack of the presumption proved fortunate for Senator
Morris Sheppard, one of the sponsors of the eighteenth amendment, when a Texas prohibi-
tion raid uncovered a still hidden away on a farm he owned. H. ASBURY, supra note 4, at 44.
39 Grogan v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Ltd., 259 U.S. 80 (1922).
40 Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co., 254 U.S. 88 (1920). But see James Everard's Brewer-
ies v. Day, 265 U.S. 545 (1924) (upholding provisions of Voltead Act proscribing sales of
existing liquor stocks); Corneli v. Moore, 257 U.S. 491 (1922) (construing the Volstead Act to
preclude releasing intoxicating liquors from a warehouse in order to transport them to the
owner's home for private consumption).
41 Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922); Regal Drug Corp. v. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386
(1922).
42 The following decisions offer examples additional to those mentioned in the text: Gros-
field v. United States, 276 U.S. 494 (1928) (upholding the "padlock" provisions of the Vol-
stead Act that authorized the closing of premises on which certain liquor violations occurred);
United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (requiring individuals to report gains from
illicit traffic in intoxicating liquor on their federal tax returns); Ford v. United States, 273
U.S. 593 (1927) (construing the Volstead Act to reach a conspirator who never entered the
United States as a member of the conspiracy); McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927)
(holding that unlawful destruction of part of a stock of intoxicating liquor did not preclude
the prosecution from introducing the remaining samples into evidence); Murphy v. United
States, 272 U.S. 630 (1926) (allowing a nuisance abatement to continue even after the owner
of the property was found not guilty in related criminal proceedings); Dodge v. United States,
272 U.S. 530 (1926) (upholding the validity of forfeiture proceedings even though the person
making the seizure was not authorized to make seizures under the Volstead Act); Hebert v.
Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926) (ruling that a state could convict a defendant of violating a
state prohibition law even though the same acts had formed the basis for a previous convic-
tion of violating the Volstead Act); Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926) (concluding
that a defendant who voluntarily testified had completely waived his fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination).
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Court construed the Volstead Act to give the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue authority to deny permits to persons he determined were not
fit to deal in non-beverage alcohol,4 3 it declared that automobiles used
to transport alcoholic beverages in violation of state or federal liquor
laws could be forfeited,44 and it recognized Congress' authority to over-
ride a physician's judgment about the medicinal value of intoxicating
liquor.
45
Nonetheless, a careful examination of the opinions of the mid-1920s
exposes the Court's underlying doubts about the techniques used to en-
force prohibition. Not only did the Court continue to respect property
rights,4 6 but it also decided in favor of defendants in several other
cases. 4 7 Moreover, even when the Court decided in favor of the govern-
ment, the decisions were less likely to be unanimous. For example, the
Court split five-to-four in two of the most widely publicized pro-govern-
ment decisions.
48
As public opposition to prohibition grew in the final years before
prohibition's repeal, the judiciary also proved increasingly willing to de-
velop doctrines that made the job of prohibition enforcement officials
more difficult. Although the transition to this new stage was neither
abrupt 49 nor constant, 50 a different approach was evident.5 1 Illustrative
43 Ma-King Products Co. v. Blair, 271 U.S. 479 (1926).
44 Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); United States v. One Ford Coupe Automo-
bile, 272 U.S. 321 (1926).
45 Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926).
46 See Commercial Credit Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 226 (1928); Port Gardner Inv.
Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 564 (1926); United States v. Zerbey, 271 U.S. 332 (1926). But
see United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. 321 (1926) (automobile used to
"conceal" liquor on which the tax had not been paid could be forfeited under the general
forfeiture provisions of the tax laws).
47 Shields v. United States, 273 U.S. 583 (1927); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927);
United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354 (1926).
48 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581
(1926). For a discussion of the Olmstead case, see notes 86-111 and accompanying text inira.
49 E.g., United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619 (1930) (plea of nolo contendere held to be as
conclusive as a plea of guilty on the issue of guilt or innocence); Danovitz v. United States,
281 U.S. 389 (1930) (relying on liberal rule of construction applicable to the Volstead Act, the
Court accepts a broad definition of the term "manufacture"); Patton v. United States, 281
U.S. 276 (1930) (defendant allowed to waive his constitutional right to a trial by a jury of
twelve).
50 Sie, e.g., Rossi v. United States, 289 U.S. 89 (1933) (convictions for carrying on the
business of a distiller, and having possession of a still, affirmed as constituting separate of-
fenses); McCormick & Co. v. Brown, 286 U.S. 131 (1932) (state's authority to subject all
alcoholic preparations to its prohibition statute upheld); United States v. The Ruth Mildred,
286 U.S. 67 (1932) (forfeiture provisions of customs laws apply when a ship licensed for fish-
ing trade is caught with a cargo of intoxicating liquor); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
United States, 286 U.S. 49 (1932) (in cases of illegal importation of intoxicating liquor, the
government may elect whether to use the forfeiture provisions of the Tariff Act or those of the
Volstead Act); Callahan v. United States, 285 U.S. 515 (1932) (illegal importation of intoxi-
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of this new trend were decisions emphasizing that the relatively strict
provisions of the Volstead Act had to be followed whenever the govern-
ment wanted to forfeit a vehicle that had been used to transport intoxi-
cating liquor,52 rulings that a permit to produce non-beverage alcohol
granted before the passage of the Volstead Act was not affected by the
Act,53 holdings that purchasing liquor was not a crime under the Vol-
stead Act, 54 decisions defining the new defense of entrapment, 55 and
opinions allowing a defendant's wife to testify in his behalf.
56
Following repeal, the Court, like the country as a whole, sought to
put behind it the prohibition experience, and the problems associated
with prohibition enforcement. Less than a year after the ratification of
the twenty-first amendment, the Court held that the adoption of the
repealing amendment operated to abate pending prosecutions.57 It sub-
sequently expanded that ruling to include cases in which convictions
were being appealed.
58
Not surprisingly, the Court's fourth amendment decisions follow
the general pattern of its prohibition opinions. The early decisions dis-
play a reluctance to exclude evidence seized in searches for alcoholic
beverages. 59 The Court's opinions during the middle years reflected an
eating liquor held a violation of the Tariff Act of 1922 and prosecutable under that statute);
Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932) (conviction for maintaining a nuisance affirmed
despite contemporaneous acquittal on related possession charge); United States v. Ryan, 284
U.S. 167 (1931) (general forfeiture provisions, rather than the stricter provisions of the Vol-
stead Act, held applicable to saloon furnishings even when the owner was criminally prose-
cuted under the Volstead Act); Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S.
577 (1931) (forfeiture of property that formed the basis of a prior conviction under the Vol-
stead Act held not to constitute double jeopardy).
51 For examples other than those mentioned in the text, see Cook v. United States, 288
U.S. 102 (1933) (construing a treaty with Great Britain to deny customs officials authority to
board British vessels); United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931) (denying the govern-
ment the right to recover civil penalties for acts that had formed the basis for a prior convic-
tion under the Volstead Act); United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931) (recognizing the
power of a federal district judge to reduce sentences imposed under the Volstead Act).
52 Richbourg Motor Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 528 (1930).
53 Campbell v. W.H. Long & Co., 281 U.S. 610 (1930); Campbell v. Galeno Chemical
Co., 281 U.S. 599 (1930).
54 United States v. Farrar, 281 U.S. 624 (1930).
55 Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
56 Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
57 United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934).
58 Massey v. United States, 291 U.S. 608 (1934). But see United States v. Mack, 295 U.S.
480 (1935) (liability on bond releasing ship seized under Volstead Act held not to have been
extinguished by repeal of the eighteenth amendment when the crew had pleaded guilty prior
to repeal).
59 See Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505
(1925); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). But see Amos v. United States, 255 U.S.
313 (1921).
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ambivalent awareness of the problems in enforcing prohibition.60 Fi-
nally, in the last years, a new emphasis on the need for a liberal con-
struction of the fourth amendment appeared.
61
Sections II and III summarize the state of fourth amendment doc-
trine at the beginning of the prohibition era and analyze the fourth
amendment decisions in more detail. These sections provide the back-
ground necessary for evaluating the significance of prohibition in the
evolution of fourth amendment doctrine.
II. THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE AT THE
OUTSET OF PROHIBITION
The law relating to search and seizure was ripe for development at
the beginning of the prohibition era. The Supreme Court's 1914 deci-
sion in Weeks v. United States62 had recently given the fourth amendment
increased significance in federal criminal trials. Over Dean Wigmore's
vociferous objections, 63 the Court had carved out a fourth amendment
exception to the rule that illegally obtained evidence could be intro-
duced into evidence at trial. Weeks required that evidence seized in vio-
lation of the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures be excluded from evidence in any subsequent fed-
eral criminal prosecution. To admit the evidence, the Court declared,
would render the fourth amendment of "no value" to those who had
been the victims of such searches.64
60 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Gambino v. United States, 275
U.S. 310 (1927); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559 (1927); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
61 See Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933); Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206
(1932); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1
(1932); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931). But see Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
62 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Court first advanced the thesis that the admission of evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment would violate the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), but Adams v. New
York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), seemed to retreat from this position. For summaries of the Court's
vacillation prior to Weeks, see Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8
A.B.A. J. 479, 480 (1922); Comment, Search, Seizure, and the Fourth and F)fh Amendments, 31
YALE Lj. 518, 520-21 (1922); Note, Formalism, LegalRealirm, and Constitutionall ProtectedlPrivay
Under the Fourth and Fjih Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 951-57 (1977).
63 See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2184 (McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE]; Wigmore, Uing Evidence Obtained
by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A. J. 479 (1922) [hereinafter cited as Wigmore, Using
Evidence].
64 232 U.S. at 393. The Weeks Court failed to explain the precise analytic basis for this
conclusion. However, the earlier Boyd decision reasoned that introduction of evidence seized
in violation of the fourth amendment violated the owner's fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886); accord, Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921). Wigmore severely criticized this reliance on an interrelation-
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Notwithstanding the clarity of the exclusionary rule, the doctrinal
framework remained largely inchoate. Because the Weeks rule was new,
relatively few details of the doctrine had been established by the time
the Court began to consider search issues in prohibition cases. To be
sure, Weeks itself recognized an exception to the normal warrant re-
quirement for searches conducted incident to the lawful arrest of a sus-
pect, and limited the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in searches
conducted by federal officials.65 Moreover, other opinions fleshed out
the basic concept by extending the protection of the amendment to pa-
pers in the mail,66 by refusing to allow the government to use the results
of one illegal search as the basis for obtaining a subsequent search war-
rant,67 by applying the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in
searches accomplished by guile as well as those accomplished by force,68
by permitting corporations to claim protection against unreasonable
searches,69 and by postulating a liberal rule of construction for the rights
protected by the fourth amendment. 70 Nonetheless, fourth amendment
doctrine remained relatively undeveloped, and large segments of mod-
ern doctrine-for example, the applicability of the fourth amendment to
ship between the fourth and fifth.amendment rights, see J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note
63, at § 2264; and some commentators who praised Weeks' exclusionary rule defended it on a
different basis. They argued that it was justified as the only reasonable means of deterring
unreasonable police conduct. See, e.g., Chaffee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1922: Evidence, 35
H- v. L. REV. 673, 694-95 (1922). But cf Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through
Unreasonable Searches andSeizures, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 11 (1925) (accepting both justifications).
One of the most confusing aspects of the law of search and seizure was the rule concern-
ing the type of objection necessary to preserve a fourth amendment claim. Weeks relied on
the pretrial objection as a reason for not invoking the evidentiary rule precluding considera-
tion of collateral issues, and the Court even distinguished Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585
(1904), on the ground that the defendant in Adams had offered his objection when the seized
evidence was offered at trial. 232 U.S. at 396, critiizedin Wigmore, Using Evidnce, supra note
63, at 481. But some later decisions considered fourth amendment claims in the absence of
pretrial objections. See, e.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (lack of pretrial
objection ignored because the facts concerning the search were not in dispute); Amos v.
United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (application not made until after jury was sworn ruled to
be timely); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (lack of pre-trial objection ignored
because defendant had no knowledge of the illegal seizure until the evidence was offered at
trial). See generally Atkinson, Prohibition and the Doctrine of the Weeks Case, 23 MICH. L. REv.
748, 753-57 (1925).
65 232 U.S. at 392, 398; cf. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (exclusionary rule
inapplicable to evidence seized by persons who were not governmental agents).
66 Expare Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
67 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
68 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921). But cf. Stroud v. United States,
251 U.S. 15, 21 (1919) (fourth amendment did not require exclusion of an inmate's letters
when "[t]hey came into the possession of the officials of the penitentiary under established
practice, reasonably designed to promote the discipline of the institution.").
69 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1919).
70 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
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electronic surveillance and automobile searches-had received no judi-
cial attention at all.
These early cases reflected some common themes. In establishing
the exclusionary rule, Weeks protected two values that were deeply
rooted in the Anglo-American property tradition: the sanctity of an in-
dividual's home as a sanctuary from government intrusion, and the per-
sonal character of an individual's papers. 7 1 Most of the pre-prohibition
cases in which the Court upheld fourth amendment claims concerned
the "papers" aspect of the property tradition, 72 and the opinions in
those cases often produced ringing endorsements of the virtues of fourth
amendment values.
Particular facts occasionally forced the Court to move beyond the
core concepts of the sanctity of the home and the personal nature of an
individual's papers. In those situations, qualifications began to creep
into the doctrine. Long before Weeks established the exclusionary rule,
the Court treated customs cases that involved the seizure of contraband
as exceptional and permitted warrantless searches based on probable
cause.73 Moreover, Weeks itself limited the scope of the amendment to
exclude from its protection a lawfully arrested defendant. In dictum,
the Court recognized an exception to the normal warrant requirement
for searches conducted incident to arrest. 74 In other decisions, when
considering whether corporations were "people" under the fourth
amendment, the Court granted corporations protection from "unreason-
able" searches, 75 but allowed the government the right to inspect corpo-
rate records under its visitorial powers so long as the government's
request was reasonable.
76
Aside from Weeks, two of the most important fourth amendment
cases arising before the prohibition era were the 1877 decision in Exparte
Jackson,77 which extended the fourth amendment protection to mailed
71 232 U.S. at 390. The property origins of fourth amendment rights received even
greater emphasis in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
72 See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Exparle Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
73 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886) (dictum). This special treat-
ment has continued down to the present. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
74 232 U.S. at 392.
75 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920); Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
76 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382-83 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-
75 (1906). See also Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913) (officers of dissolved corpo-
ration cannot refuse to produce corporate records that would incriminate them).
77 96 U.S. 727 (1877). While upholding Congress' power to make the mailing of lottery
tickets a crime, Jackson declared that the fourth amendment's protection extended to all
mailed matter that is "intended to be kept free from inspection, such as letters, and sealed
packages subject to letter postage." 96 U.S. at 733. Even after this type of mail had been
turned over to the Post Office for delivery to the addressee, it remained "as fully guarded
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matter, and the 1921 decision in Gouledv. United States ,78 which held that
the amendment covered searches conducted by stealth and that the gov-
ernment had no authority to search for "papers of evidentiary value
only." Both illustrate the broad and sympathetic reading of the fourth
amendment the Court adopted in the pre-prohibition "papers" cases.
The decisions also developed specific doctrinal points that were impor-
tant in the prohibition cases.
III. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE PROHIBITION ERA
This section examines the ways in which the prohibition era cases
altered existing fourth amendment doctrines. It analyzes the Supreme
Court's decisions in five areas: definition of basic terms; exceptions to
the warrant requirement; cooperation with non-federal investigators;
the probable cause requirement; and warrant-related issues.
A. THE DEFINITION OF TERMS
Once Weeks established-the exclusionary rule, the Court faced the
problem of defining the limits of the doctrine. That process of definition
was the principal focus of the two important prohibition cases discussed
from examination and inspection, except as to ... outward form and weight," as if the party
forwarding it had retained it in his own domicile. Id Since the fourth amendment applied,
mail could "only be opened and examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are
subjected to search in one's own household." Id
78 255 U.S. 298 (1921). Gouled involved a number of important constitutional issues, but
two holdings were particularly significant with respect to the development of fourth amend-
ment doctrine during the prohibition era. Ruling that the amendment covers searches con-
ducted by stealth as well as those relying on direct governmental authority the Court said:
[W]hether entrance to the home or office of a person suspected of crime be obtained by a
representative of any branch or subdivision of the government of the United States by
stealth, or through social acquaintance, or in the guise of a business call, and whether the
owner be present or not when he enters, any search and seizure subsequently and secretly
made in his absence, falls within the scope of the prohibition of the Fourth
Amendment. ....
255 U.S. at 306. Furthermore, Gouled unequivocally declared that the fourth amendment did
not authorize the issuance of search warrants for any papers having "evidential value" as to
crimes committed by the owner of the papers. To the contrary, search warrants were proper
only when:
a primary right to [the] search and seizure may be found in the interest which the public
or the complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the posses-
sion of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders possession of the property
by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be taken.
Id at 309. The Court justified both holdings by applying the rule of liberal construction that
demanded that the fourth and fifth amendments be construed "so as to prevent stealthy en-
croachment upon or 'gradual depreciation' of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible




below. In essence, the Court was deciding what types of activities the
amendment covered.
Fourth amendment law prior to prohibition reflected a judicial
willingness to avoid narrow interpretations that would severely restrict
the scope of the amendment's reach. Two of the clearest examples of
this expansive approach are Jackson79 and Gouled.8 0
During the prohibition era, the Court was considerably less gener-
ous in extending the reach of the fourth amendment. For example, in
1924, Hester v. United States8 ' circumscribed the amendment's reach by
distinguishing lawful observations of enforcement authorities from
searches and by excluding "open fields" surrounding a house from the
amendment's protectioh.
The facts in Hester were relatively simple. Having received infor-
mation on Hester, revenue agents hid approximately 100 yards from the
house where Hester lived. Standing on land they "supposed" to belong
to Hester's father, who owned the house under observation, the agents
watched a man drive near the house and saw Hester come out and give
the visitor a quart bottle. After sounding an alarm, the agents arrested
Hester and examined the liquid in the quart bottle, the contents of a jug
Hester extracted from a nearby car, and the residue in ajar lying on the
ground near the house. According to the testimony of the experienced
agents, all three contained whiskey.
8 2
Justice Holmes rejected the claim that the agents had committed
an illegal search or seizure. He distinguished searches covered by the
amendment from permissible police surveillance. Even if the agents had
committed a trespass, he concluded, their testimony "was not obtained
by an illegal search or seizure," for Hester's "own acts, and those of his
associates, disclosed the jug, the jar and the bottle. '8 3 Moreover, "there
was no seizure in the sense of the law when the officers examined the
contents" of the containers, because they had been thrown aside when
the officers sounded the alarm.
8 4
Nor did the examination of the containers on the land outside the
79 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
80 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
81 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
82 Id at 58. Justice Holmes did not specify what "information" prompted the agents to
watch Hester's house, and the record provides only slightly more information. One of the
prohibition agents testified that "we had destroyed distilleries near [Hester's] house before
and we had information that he kept whiskey there." The Court, however, struck "that state-
ment" on the ground the agent could not "state what his information was." Record at 15,
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). The agents did, in fact, search Hester's house,
but Justice Holmes dismissed the search as "immaterial" because the search of the dwelling
did not uncover any evidence.




house amount to an illegal search. The fourth amendment, Holmes
noted, afforded protection to the people only in their "persons, houses,
papers and effects." That protection did not extend to "open fields," for
"[t]he distinction between the [open fields] and the house is as old as the
common law."
85
A second important prohibition era opinion defined the term
"search" as restrictively as Hester had defined the phrase "persons,
houses, papers, and effects." In 1928, Olmstead v. United States
86
presented the question whether evidence obtained by surreptitious "tap-
ping" of an individual's telephone could be introduced into evidence at
his criminal trial.
Olmstead had established a highly successful smuggling operation
in Seattle, Washington.87 In 1924, the chief assistant in the Seattle office
85 Id at 59 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 223, 225, 226).
Relatively few lower federal court opinions during the prohibition era dealt with the
definitional problems addressed in these Supreme Court cases. This paucity of decisions sug-
gests that Hester and Ohrstead involved techniques that were infrequently used in prohibition
enforcement. Hester's exclusion of "open fields" from the scope of the fourth amendment's
protection would rarely help prohibition agents in urban areas where enforcement encoun-
tered its most serious difficulties and where few urban dwellings would contain a large yard in
which agents could conceal themselves while observing the dwelling. Nor would Hester be
useful when suspects kept their supplies and transactions inside, because, even in the prohibi-
tion era, the Court normally required warrants to justify intrusions into a dwelling. See Amos
v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); ef Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932) (dwelling
did not lose the special protection to which it was entitled under the Volstead Act merely
because intoxicating liquor was manufactured there). But see Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20 (1925) (dictum) (warrantless searches of houses that are the sites of lawful arrests are
lawful).
86 277 U.S. 438 (1928). For a harsh critique of the Otmstead decision, see Black, An III-
StarredProhibition Case: Olmsteadv. United States, 18 GEo. L.J. 120 (1930), repritedin F. BLACK,
supra note 30, at 79-90.
87 The story leading up to the Olmstead decision begins in 1920, when a highly regarded
young police lieutenant was attracted by the financial opportunities associated with bootleg-
ging in Seattle, Washington. Early in his new endeavor, he was apprehended by prohibition
agents and fined $500. This escapade led to his dismissal from the police force, and so he
turned his full attention to a new career in smuggling liquor from Canada. Supported by
eleven investors who contributed $1000 each, Olmstead soon established a highly successful
smuggling operation. By the simple device of clearing the ships on which he carried his Ca-
nadian liquor for Mexico rather than the United States, he avoided Canada's heavy export
tax on liquor cleared for the United States. He also secured cash discounts for his large
volume purchases and developed an efficient distribution system. The net result of these
innovations was that Olmstead succeeded in underselling his competition by as much as
thirty percent; he thus established a virtual monopoly of the Seattle bootlegging business.
Olmstead's close contacts within the local political structure and police force allowed him to
operate with near impunity. He was a well-known and apparently respected citizen of Seat-
de. The definitive history of prohibition in Washington even credits him with stabilizing the
price of liquor so "that good whiskey in Seattle cost only two dollars more a bottle than it did
in the government stores of British Columbia." N. CLARK, supra note 16, at 161. The sum-
mary of Olmstead facts is derived from Clark's account as well as the Court's opinion and the
record and briefs filed in the Supreme Court.
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of the Prohibition Bureau hired a free lance wiretapper as a prohibition
agent, and had him insert taps on phones at Olmstead's office and at
several other locations.88 The government did not introduce transcripts
of the tapped conversations into evidence. Agents did, however, testify
regarding the conversations, and they were allowed to refresh their
memories by consulting the transcripts. The trial court overruled objec-
tions to this testimony. A jury then convicted Olmstead of violating the
Volstead Act, and the district judge sentenced him to a four-year term
of imprisonment.89 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. 90
As it had done in Hester, the Supreme Court decided the merits in
favor of the prosecution, but this time the Court split five-to-four in so
doing. Chief Justice Taft declared that "[t]he reasonable view is that
one who installs in his house a telephone instrument with connecting
wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and that the
wires beyond his house, and messages while passing over them, are not
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment." 91 According to the
majority, none of the Court's earlier decisions had found a violation of
the fourth amendment except in situations involving "an official search
88 According to Olmstead, the wire tapper had originally tried to sell him a transcript of
taped conversations for $10,000. Id at 168. Although Olmstead was aware of the tapes, he
did not significantly alter his operations; he apparently remained confident that a Washing-
ton statute forbidding wiretaps, WASH. COMP. STAT. § 2656-18 (Remington, 1922), would
make evidence obtained against him inadmissible in any criminal prosecution.
89 While serving his prison term, Olmstead embraced the Christian Science faith and be-
came convinced "that liquor [was] bad for man and society." N. CLARK, supra note 16, at
218.
90 19 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1927). A divided panel defined the purpose of the fourth amend-
ment as preventing "the invasion of homes and offices and the seizure of incriminating evi-
dence found therein." Id at 847. Without addressing the question of whether tapping
telephone wires is "an unethical intrusion upon the privacy of persons who are suspected of
crime," the court concluded that "it is not an act which comes within the letter of the prohibi-
tion of constitutional provisions." Id Evidence obtained by wiretaps was thus indistinguish-
able, the court said, from secret observation or eavesdropping.
Judge Rodkin dissented. Id at 848-50. He argued that the chief purpose of the fourth
and fifth amendment was to protect "the individual in his liberty and in the privacies of life."
Id at 849. The proper case for analogy was Jackson, for "[a] person using the telegraph or
telephone [was] not broadcasting to the world," but was sealing his conversation "from the
public as completely as. . . the instrumentalities employed will permit." Id at 850. Thus, to
further the purpose of the fourth amendment, he interpreted it to deny a "federal officer or
federal agent. . a right to take [a person's] message from the wires, in order that it may be
used against him." Id
91 277 U.S. at 466. The ChiefJustice prefaced his rejection of the constitutional argument
with a lengthy survey of the Court's earlier decisions construing the fourth amendment.
He also rejected the suggestion that the Court should fashion a nonconstitutional rule
excluding the evidence because the wiretaps had violated state law. "The common-law rule,"
he noted, "is that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means by
which it was obtained." Id at 467. Weeks' exclusionary rule was a narrow exception to that
rule "required by constitutional limitations." Id Since the constitutional limitations were
inapplicable in Olmstead, "[t]he common-law rule must apply." Id at 468.
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and seizure of [an individual's] person or such a seizure of his papers or
his tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of his house
'or curtilage' for the purpose of making a seizure." From this definition
of the principle underlying earlier cases, the Court concluded that "the
wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to a search or seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
92 -
In large measure, the Court's ultimate conclusion was based on its
narrow reading of Gouled93 andJacson.94 Gouled, the Chief Justice ar-
gued, "carried the inhibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
to the extreme limit," and its authority would not be "enlarged by im-
plication. ' 95 When thus confined to its facts, Gouled was distinguishable
because a government agent actually entered "into the private quarters
of [the] defendant and . . : [took away] something tangible"; by con-
trast, the Oinstead testimony only concerned "voluntary conversations
secretly overheard.1 96 Jackson was also easily distinguishable, according
to the Chief Justice. Since a "letter is a paper, an effect, and in the
custody of a government that forbids carriage, except under its protec-
tion," it fell "plainly within the words of the amendment to say that the
unlawful rifling by a government agent of a sealed letter is a search and
seizure of the sender's papers or effects."' 97 By contrast, the amendment
could not naturally apply to the government's actions in Olnstead. The
federal government did not take "such care of telegraph or telephone
messages as of mailed sealed letters." 98 Even more importantly, the
wiretapping case involved neither "searching" nor "seizure"; the agents
secured the evidence "by the use of the sense of hearing and that only,"
without any "entry of the houses or offices of the defendants." 99
In contrast, the Chief Justice found the narrow approach ofHester a
persuasive precedent. Even though the officers in Hester were guilty of a
trespass, the Court nonetheless found that they had not engaged in a
search of the defendant's person, house, papers, or effects. 100
Justice Brandeis' dissent' 01 charged that the majority's narrow ap-
92 Id at 466.
93 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
94 See sura note 77 and accompanying text.
95 277 U.S. at 463.




1o0 Id at 465.
101 Id at 471-85. "Independently of the constitutional question" that is discussed in the
text, Justice Brandeis would have excluded the Olrnsead testimony because it was obtained in
violation of state law. Id at 479-80. Although these unlawful acts "were crimes only of the
officers individually" when they were committed, the government "assumed moral responsi-
bility for the officers' crimes" when it tried "to avail itself of the fruits of these acts. . . to
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proach in Olnstead was inconsistent with the spirit of the Court's own
precedents. "Time and again," he asserted, these precedents had re-
jected "an unduly literal construction" of the fourth amendment.
10 2
Thus, he argued that the Court should construe the fourth and fifth
amendments to confer "the right to be let alone-the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. ' 10 3 To enforce
that right, the Court should declare "every unjustifiable intrusion by the
government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means em-
ployed," a violation of the fourth amendment. 1' 4
While 0/istead initially might appear to have offered prohibition
officials an enforcement method that would be frequently employed,
such a conclusion ignores the political reality of the times. By the time
Olnstead was decided, the federal government, as the dissenting opinion
in Olstead itself emphasized, 05 had disavowed the use of wiretaps as an
enforcement device.106 Indeed, the internal opposition to wiretapping
within the government was so significant that the Assistant Attorney
General, originally assigned to handle the appeal for the government,
asked to be relieved of the assignment after the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 10 7 In the prohibition years after the 1928 0/nistead decision,
opposition to the eighteenth amendment grew substantially.108 Conse-
quently, it is not surprising that the officials in charge of prohibition
enforcement failed to exploit an investigatory technique that was likely
to strengthen and to crystallize opposition to their work.
Even though Hester and 0/nistead involved relatively isolated and
episodic problems, the Supreme Court's treatment of them is consistent
with the general trend of the decisions. As one of the early prohibition
cases, the unanimous opinion in Hester conformed to the public approval
accomplish its own ends." Id at 483. When "the government becomes a lawbreaker," he
concluded in a rhetorical flourish, "it breeds contempt for the law. . . [and] invites anarchy."
Id at 485. Since declaring "that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies
the means. . . would bring terrible retribution," he urged the Court "resolutely [to] set its
face" against "that pernicious doctrine." Id
102 Id at 476.
103 Id at 478. See genera4ly Warren & Brandeis, The Right to -4,taew, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193
(1890).
104 277 U.S. at 478.
105 277 U.S. at 483 n.15 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
106 Brief for the Government at 41, Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438 (1928); see also
N. CLARK, supra note 16, at 174; cf. M. WILLEBRANDT, THE INSIDE OF PROHIBrrboN 231
(1929) (statement of opposition to wiretapping by Assistant Attorney General in charge of
prohibition cases). A 1927 report submitted to Congress expressed general disapproval of
illegal conduct by prohibition agents, S. Doc. No. 198, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at IV; pt.
2, 2 (1927); and wiretapping was illegal in most states. See Olmstead v. United States, Brief
for Amicus Curiae, at 11.
107 N. CLARK, sura note 16, at 176; M. WILLEBRANDT, seepra note 106, at 232.
108 See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
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of prohibition. By accepting surreptitious trespass on the property of
private citizens as a natural incident of effective enforcement of the
eighteenth amendment, the Court indicated that it-like the general
public-had not yet developed serious reservations about techniques of
prohibition enforcement. Moreover, precedents did not dictate this nar-
row construction of the reach of the amendment; in fact, the opinion
does not cite any of the Court's earlier opinions as authority for its deci-
sion. Indeed, in comparison with the small group of arguably relevant
precedents, Hester reflects more of a break with tradition than a continu-
ation of it. The earlier decisions manifest an approach to the fourth
amendment that is far less literal than the Hester opinion.
By the time the Court decided 0/nstead, doubts about the value of
prohibition and its effects on American life were widespread. The sup-
porters of prohibition, however, still dominated the political scene. The
passage of the Jones Act109 in 1929 illustrates the political climate of the
late 1920s. Congress encouraged leniency for casual offenders but signif-
icantly increased the penalties for others.
The split in the 0/nstead Court seems to reflect the tensions under-
lying the Jones Act, that is, the desire to punish blatant violators but not
casual offenders. While the dissenters in 0/instead perceived significant
dangers in unbridled prohibition enforcement, the majority refused to
endorse an approach that would allow a defendant, whose violations of
the law were serious and pervasive, to go free. After all, Olmstead was
not merely a casual, minor offender of prohibition. The operation that
formed the basis of the defendants' convictions was "a conspiracy of
amazing magnitude to import, possess, and sell liquor unlawfully" with
aggregate yearly sales exceeding $2,000,000.110 In this conspiracy, Olm-
stead's role was preeminent. The New York Times later described Olm-
stead's Seattle operation as "one of the most gigantic rumrunning
conspiracies in the country."11
Thus, in defining fourth amendment activity, the two major
Supreme Court opinions exemplify the change in public mood. Al-
though both decisions favored the government, the seeds of opposition
to the narrow interpretation of the fourth amendment can be seen in the
Olmstead dissent.
B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The fourth amendment contains no explicit requirement that offi-
cials obtain a warrant before conducting a search. The warrant require-
109 Pub. L. No. 70-899, 45 Stat. 1446 (repealed 1935).
110 277 U.S. at 455-56; see also M. WILLBRANIr, supra note 106, at 234-36.
111 N.Y. Times, May 27, 1930, at 1, col. 7.
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ment is, however, a natural implication of the amendment's
juxtaposition of its prohibition of "unreasonable" searches next to the
probable cause requirement that must be satisfied before a warrant can
be issued. Although the Supreme Court has generally accepted the im-
plication, it has recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. The
prohibition cases were significant in developing the content of some of
the major exceptions.
I. Incident-to-Arrest Searches
A well recognized exception to the warrant requirement allows po-
lice officers to search persons they have arrested. Dicta in Weeks itself
confirmed the existence of this "incident-to-arrest" exception," 2 but
Agnello v. United States 13 was the first case to uphold an incident-to-ar-
rest search as constitutional. Agnello was rendered at the beginning of
the prohibition era and involved a violation of the Harrison Anti-Nar-
cotic Act.1 4 The decision sanctioned the search of persons arrested, and
the search of the premises on which the arrests occurred.115 Nonetheless,
the Court decided that the arrest of the Agnello defendants did not jus-
tify searching a dwelling "several blocks distant" from the place where
the arrest occurred. The Court held that by the time the second search
had occurred, "the conspiracy was ended and the defendants were
under arrest and in custody elsewhere."" 6
Agnello was not the final word on the scope of the incident-to-arrest
exception. Determining the confines of the exception proved to be a
112 232 U.S. at 392.
113 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
114 Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
115 269 U.S. at 30 ("The legality of the arrests, or of the searches and seizures made at the
home of Alba, is not questioned. Such searches and seizures naturally and usually appertain
to and attend such arrests.').
116 Id at 31. In making this distinction, Justice Butler's opinion for a unanimous Court
displayed a reluctance to approve warrantless searches of private dwellings. Conceding that
the Supreme Court had never "directly decided" the point, he emphasized that "it has always
been assumed that one's house cannot lawfully be searched without a search warrant, except
as incident to a lawful arrest therein." Id at 32 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
624 et seq.); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 308 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States; 251 U.S. 385, 391 (1919); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
Later in the opinion, he repeated the assumption (in an only slightly less dogmatic form) as a
rule. 269 U.S. at 33 ("Save in certain cases as incident to arrest, there is no sanction in the
decisions of the courts, federal or state, for the search of a private dwelling house without a
warrant."). In addition, he emphatically denied the existence of any general probable cause
exception to the rule: "Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a
dwelling house, furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant. And
such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable
cause." Id For a criticism of Agnello's refusal to allow arrests to justify searches in places
other than where the arrest occurred, see Note, The EFect of the Agnello Case on "Incidental"
Searches and Seizures, 35 YALE LJ. 612 (1926).
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continuing problem for the Court, which rendered opinions addressing
the subject in four different prohibition cases. The first decisions, ren-
dered in the middle years of the prohibition decade, involved serious
offenders, and the Court adopted an expansive reading of the exception.
Decisions rendered at the end of the prohibition, however, began to re-
strict the reach of the exception, simultaneously with an increase in pub-
lic concern over techniques of prohibition enforcement.
The Court initially dealt with the incident-to-arrest exception in
United States v. Lee,' 1 7 decided in the 1926 term. Lee involved the seizure
of a motorboat containing seventy-one cases of grain alcohol "in a re-
gion commonly spoken of as Rum Row, at a point 24 miles from
land."' 18 The principal issue concerned the authority of customs offi-
cials to search American vessels beyond the twelve mile boundary." 9
Almost as an afterthought, Justice Brandeis offered the incident-to-ar-
rest exception as an alternate justification for the search.
In explaining the incident-to-arrest exception, Lee implicitly treated
the motorboat as the "premises" on which the search occurred. Search
of the boat was thus permissible, especially since the trial had produced
no evidence of "any exploration below decks or under hatches" and
"[f]or aught that appears, the cases of liquor were on deck and, like the
defendants, were discovered before the motorboat was boarded."'
120
The person making the arrest had scanned the boat with a searchlight
when making the arrest, but that action did not violate the Constitution
because "[s]uch use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine
glass or a field glass."' 2'
United States v. Marron,122 decided the following year, was the
Court's first detailed consideration of the incident-to-arrest exception in
a prohibition case. It exemplifies the approach identified earlier as char-
117 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
118 Id at 560.
119 The Court held that Coast Guard officers had such authority "when there is probable
cause to believe [vessels] subject to seizure for violation of revenue laws." Id at 562.
120 Id at 563.
121 Id
122 275 U.S. 192 (1927). A United States Commissioner had issued a warrant authorizing
the search of the premises leased by Marron. The warrant described the things to be seized as
"intoxicating liquors and articles for their manufacture." Prohibition agents went to the
premises the next day and, after securing admission by ringing the doorbell, observed about a
dozen persons in the place, "some of [whom] were being furnished intoxicating liquors." Id
at 193-94. The agents handed the warrant to the individual in charge and placed him under
arrest; they then "searched for and found large quantities of liquor, some of which [were] in a
closet." Id at 194. The agents also found and seized certain items not named in the warrant.
In the closet, they uncovered "a ledger showing inventories of liquors, receipts, expenses, in-
cluding gifts to police officers, and other things relating to the business"; and "beside the cash
register," they discovered "a number of bills against petitioner for gas, electric light, water,
and telephone service furnished on the premises." Id
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acteristic of the prohibition cases in the second half of the 1920s-an
ambivalent Court beginning to perceive the dangers in prohibition en-
forcement but unwilling to let serious offenders go free. Justice Butler's
unanimous opinion in Marron refused to allow agents to use a search
warrant to justify seizure of items not named in the warrant. The opin-
ion, however, ultimately upheld the challenged seizures by broadly de-
fining the "premises" that could be searched pursuant to an arrest and
the things that could be seized as instruments of the crime for which the
arrest was made. When the agents arrived at the premises to be
searched, they immediately arrested the individual in charge. That in-
dividual "was actually engaged in a conspiracy to maintain, and was
actually in charge of, the premises where intoxicating liquors were being
unlawfully sold.' 123 Thus, the arrest was lawful as one for a "crime
committed in [the agent's] presence,"' 124 and the agents "had a right
without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order to
find and seize the things used to carry on the criminal enterprise."'
125
Pursuant to this authority, the agents could seize both the ledger and
various bills and receipts. Seizing the ledger was permissible because "it
was. . . a part of the outfit or equipment actually used to commit the
offense," and seizing the bills was constitutional because "they were con-
venient, if not in fact necessary, for the keeping of accounts" and "so
closely related to the business" that it was "not unreasonable to consider
them as used to carry it on."
126
In two cases decided near the end of the prohibition era, the Court
again returned to the incident-to-arrest exception. In unanimous deci-
sions, the Court held a challenged seizure invalid in each case and set
aside the convictions obtained through use of the seized evidence.
12 7
Not surprisingly, these decisions claim doctrinal continuity with earlier
cases, but the shift in focus is dramatic. Both opinions emphasize the
need for a broad construction of the fourth amendment to protect all
individuals-innocent and guilty alike-from arbitrary governmental
power.1
28
In Go-Bart v. United States , prohibition agents falsely claimed to have
123 275 U.S. at 198.
124 Id
125 Id at 199. Moreover, the Court emphasized, the seizure of the ledger was valid even
though it was found in a closet. The area that the officers could search incident to a valid
arrest "extended to all parts of the premises used for the illegal purpose." Id The closet
where the ledger was found "was used as a part of the saloon" and thus was part of the area in
the "immediate possession and control" of the person arrested. Id
126 Id
127 Lefkowitz v. United States Attorney, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
128 285 U.S. at 464; 282 U.S. at 357.
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warrants and searched the three room office of Go-Bart Importing Com-
pany. The agents forced the President and Secretary Treasurer whom
they had arrested to open locked desks in the office. In the course of the
search, they seized an assortment of intoxicating liquor, and numerous
records which pertained to officers' unlawful dealings in intoxicating
liquors.'
29
The Court treated "the arrests as lawful and valid."1 30 It nonethe-
less ruled that the agents had-violat-d the fourth amendment and re-
quired the seized papers to be returned to the company.131
Emphasizing the generality of the fourth amendment's prohibition
against "unreasonable searches and seizures,"' 132 the Go-Bart Court un-
derscored that "reasonableness" must be decided on the facts and cir-
cumstances of a particular case.133 The Court viewed the search of Go-
Bart's office as "a lawless invasion of the premises and a general explora-
tory search in the hope that evidence of crime might be found.
'134
Without specifying precisely which facts were crucial in reaching this
conclusion, the a--Bart opinion enumerated four factors: the lack of any
evidence that a crime was being committed at the time the arrests were
made; the failure to obtain a search warrant even though the special
agent in charge "had an abundance of information and time to swear
out a valid warrant"; the "pretension of right and threat of force" used
in the search; and "the general and apparently unlimited [nature of the]
search, ransacking the desk, safe, filing cases and other parts of the
office.' 1
35
The Court was vague in distinguishing Marron. Although the opin-
ion vehemently asserted that "[p]lainly" the two cases were "essentially
different," it merely catalogued a series of factual distinctions136 without
explaining their significance.
The Supreme Court further limited the incident-to-arrest exception
in United States v. Lejowiz, 137 the other decision rendered at the end of
the prohibition era. Armed with an arrest warrant charging the LeZo-
129 282 U.S. at 351.
130 Id at 356. The Court also noted that no objection was made to the searches of the
persons arrested.
131 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
132 Id at 357.
133 id
134 Id at 358.
135 Id
136 The Court specifically mentioned three differences: the person arrested in Matron was
one "who in pursuance of a conspiracy was actually engaged in running a saloon"; the things
seized in Marron were "visible and accessible and in the offender's immediate custody"; and
the agents who made the Matron seizure did so "without threat of force" and without engag-
ing in a "general search or rummaging of the place." Id
137 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
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witz defendants with conspiracy to sell and transport intoxicating li-
quors, 138 prohibition agents arrested Lefkowitz and searched the room
in which he was arrested. In searching the room, "[t]he agents opened
all the drawers of both desks, examined their contents, took. . . away
books, papers and other articles. They also searched the towel cabinet
and took papers from it. . . . They also took the contents of the bas-
kets and later pasted together pieces of paper found therein."' 39
Echoing the "reasonableness" emphasis of the Co-Bart opinion, Jus-
tice Butler declared that the "only question presented" in Lefkowitz was
"whether the searches of the desks, cabinet and baskets and the seizures
of the things taken from them were reasonable as an incident of ....
valid arrests under the warrant."'14 He concluded that they were un-
reasonable. The conduct of the agents "was unrestrained" as shown by
the number and variety of things taken. Moreover, the officers wanted
the papers "solely for use as evidence of crime of which [the defendants]
were accused or suspected."' 141 Searches and seizures of such papers was
impermissible "even under a search warrant issued upon ample evi-
dence and precisely describing such things and disclosing exactly where
they were." The incident-to-arrest exception "certainly" did not confer
greater search authority "than that conferred by a search warrant issued
upon adequate proof and sufficiently describing the things to be
obtained."14
2
As in Go-Bart, Justice Butler distinguished Marron by cataloging a
number of factual differences without explaining why the differences
were significant. In Marron, "prohibition officers. . . arrested the bar-
tender for crime openly committed in their presence"; the officers did
not search for the ledger and bills seized but merely picked up items "in
plain view"; and the ledger and bills seized were being used "to carry on
the criminal enterprise" for which the defendants were convicted. By
contrast, the Lelkowitz record failed "to support the claim that, at the
time of the arrest. . . any crime was being committed in the presence of
138 On January 12, 1931, a prohibition agent filed a complaint before a United States
Commissioner charging that the Leftowiz defendants, "commencing June 21, 1930, and con-
tinuing to the time of making the complaint," had engaged in a conspiracy "to sell, possess,
transport, furnish, deliver and take orders for intoxicating liquor" in violation of the Volstead
Act. According to the complaint, the defendants solicited orders from a certain room identi-
fied by its address; they then arranged for orders to be delivered by common carriers and
collected the proceeds of the sale. Since "[t]he allegations of the complaint show[ed] that the
complaining witness had knowledge and information of facts amply sufficient to justify the
accusation," the commissioner issued the warrant. 285 U.S. at 458.
139 285 U.S. at 458-60. For a detailed listing of the items, see id at 459 n.1, 460 n.2.
140 Id at 463.
141 Id at 464.
142 Id at 464-65.
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the officers";143 the searches conducted by the agents "were exploratory
and general and made solely to find evidence of [the defendants'] guilt
of the alleged conspiracy or some other crime"; and "the papers and
other articles found and taken were in themselves unoffending," al-
though they were "intended to be used to solicit orders for liquor in
violation of the Act."'144 Even though the Court indicated that the last
difference was the crucial one, 14 5 it made no further effort to elaborate
upon the differing character of the items in Marron and Lejkowitz, but
chose instead to follow the more recent authority of Go-Bart.'
46
When one surveys the incident-to-arrest cases as a group, they seem
fully consistent with the general "drift" of the Supreme Court's prohibi-
tion cases. The first two decisions display the ambivalence characteristic
of opinions rendered between 1926 and 1930. On the one hand, both
supported prosecutors in their struggles against large scale violators of
the law. Lee involved an arrest in the notorious "Rum Row" that was
the center of the smuggling trade, 14 7 while Maron challenged a raid on a
saloon-type operation that seemed to have operated quite openly.148 On
the other hand, in Marron the Court demonstrated an increasing aware-
ness of potential enforcement abuses. Most of the Marron opinion deals
with an issue the Court could have ignored, the rejection of the govern-
ment's alternate rationale that officers could seize things not specifically
described when conducting a search authorized by a valid search war-
rant. The Court's own explanation for rendering this dictum on seizing
items not listed in the warrant rests on the assertion in the government's
brief "that the facts of this case present one of the most frequent causes
of appeals in current cases."'14 9 In light of this explanation, one can best
understand the Maron opinion as striving to strike a balance between
freeing a serious offender and sanctioning increasingly obvious abuses in
the enforcement of the prohibition laws.
The last two incident-to-arrest cases came in the decade of the
1930s and reflect a return to a "liberal" construction of the fourth
143 Id at 463.
144 Id at 465.
145 Id at 465-66.
146 Id at 467.
147 Seegeneraly H. ASBURY, supra note 4, at 241-55; C. MERZ, supra note 4, at 113-15; A.
SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 198-99. For a very optimistic assessment of the government's suc-
cess in routing Rum Row, see M. WILLEBRANDT, supra note 106, at 220-30; see also R.
HAYNES, PROHIBIrrION INSIDE OuT 69-86 (1923).
148 275 U.S. at 193-94 ("There were six or seven rooms containing slot machines, an ice
box, tables, chairs, and a cash register. The evidence shows that the place was used for
retailing and drinking intoxicating liquor. About a dozen men and women were there, and
some of them were being furnished intoxicating liquors."). See also Marron v. United States, 8
F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1925).
149 275 U.S. at 195.
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amendment, even when that construction results in freeing some rela-
tively serious offenders.150 The Court's own confusion is apparent in the
conflicting justifications it offered. In G-Bart, the Court emphasized the
nature of the criminal activity and the general nature of the search con-
ducted. Lekowitz understandably cited Go-Bart as the controlling prece-
dent, but then shifted the emphasis to the nature of the items seized.
The Court's increased concern about abusive enforcement techniques
provides a more likely explanation for the decisions.
2. Automobile Searches
The incident-to-arrest exception was not the only circumstance in
which the Supreme Court permitted warrantless searches during the
prohibition era. A second major exception developed for automobile
searches.
The automobile began to exert its enormous influence on American
life in the first two decades of the twentieth century.' 51 Its impact on
American legal institutions is easily discernible in a number of statu-
tory152 and judicial I5 3 developments. It is not surprising, therefore, that
automobiles also required special treatment in the law of search and
seizure. The increased availability of automobiles during the 1920s was
a boon to bootleggers. Not only did it greatly enhance their transporta-
tion capabilities, but the mobility of automobiles also made use of
150 The evidence obtained in both Go-Bart, 282 U.S. at 351, and Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. at
462-63, suggested an on-going business of soliciting and filling orders for intoxicating liquors.
151 The number of automobiles increased dramatically after the turn of the century; total
registrations rose from eight thousand in 1900 to more than nine million in 1920 and then to
twenty-six and one-half million in 1929. J. RAE, THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE 238 (1965)
(Table 7); see also J. FUNK, AMERICA ADOPTs THE AUTOMOBILE, 1895-1910 55-60 (1970).
By the 1920s, the automotive industry was the largest in the county. Two million
automobiles were manufactured in 1920, and this figure grew to five and one-half million by
1929. The development of techniques of mass production and consumer credit helped to
reshape American life as well as to stimulate a variety of associated industries like highway
construction and steel manufacturing. J. RAE, THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE at 48-52, 56-91,
238 (Table 6); see a/so D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 422-
27, 546-55 (1973); J. RAE, THE RoAD AND THE CAR IN AMERICAN LIFE 40-59 (1971).
152 See, e.g., Federal Highway Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-87, 42 Stat. 212 (1921); Road
Aid Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-156, 39 Stat. 355 (1916); J. FtuNx, supra note 151, at 165-91
(summary of state regulation of registration, licensing, and speed); Chamberlain, Compulsoy
Insurance of Automobiles, 12 A.B.A. J. 49 (1926).
153 See, e.g., Brown, The Stats of the Automobile, 17 YALE L.J. 223 (1908); Chamberlain,
Automobiles and Vicarious Liabilip, 10 A.B.A. J. 788 (1924); Falknor, The Dotn)e ofjoint Adven-
ture in Automobile Law, 1 WASH. L. REv. 113 (1925); McCabe, The Dut of an Automobile Owner to
a Gratuitous Guest, 6 NoTRE DAME LAw. 300 (1931); Note, The Family Car Doctrine, 15 GEO.
L.J. 471 (1927). An interesting interplay between statutory and judicial developments oc-
curred with respect to state court jurisdiction. Legislatures passed new "long-arm" statutes,
and the Supreme Court modified the restraints of the due process clause to accommodate




search warrants difficult, since the automobile might move to another
location or finish delivering its illicit cargo while agents were seeking the
warrant. Early in the prohibition enforcement effort, lower federal
courts recognized the unique mobility of automobiles by fashioning a
new exception to the warrant requirement. 154 The Supreme Court
placed its imprimature on the automobile exception in Carroll v. United
States.155
Prohibition agents in the Detroit area suspected Carroll of bootleg-
ging liquor. While on patrol they spotted Carroll's roadster and gave
chase, suspecting him to be a "run." The agents searched the car and
found sixty cases of liquor Carroll had hidden behind the back seat.' 5
6
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of the Car-
roll defendants.' 57 In upholding the seizure of the whiskey, the opinion
narrowed the scope of the warrant requirement in two respects: by sanc-
tioning a broad exception for vehicular searches in prohibition cases;
and by expanding the traditional doctrine concerning a police officer's
authority to arrest without a warrant.
Chief Justice Taft's majority opinion established the validity of a
special exception to the warrant requirement in automobile cases. The
text and legislative history of the Volstead Act convinced him that Con-
gress intended to distinguish "between the necessity for a search warrant
in the searching of private dwellings and in that of automobiles and
other road vehicles."' 158 Thus, the issue before the Court was whether
"such a distinction [was] consistent with the fourth amendment." The
Chief Justice concluded the distinction was permissible because the
amendment "does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as
154 E.g., Boyd v. United States, 286 F. 930 (4th Cir. 1923); Lambert v. United States, 282
F. 413 (9th Cir. 1922); United States v. Rembert, 284 F. 996 (S.D. Tex. 1922). For a particu-
larly tolerant lower court decision, see United States v. Batement, 278 F. 231, 235 (S.D. Cal.
1922).
155 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The special treatment for automobiles has continued to the pres-
ent. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). But see Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753
(1979) (warrant required to search luggage taken from automobile in a valid warrantless
search); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (random checks for drivers' licenses and
registration certificates violate the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment); United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (warrant required to search locked footlocker in an
automobile parked at a curb).
156 267 U.S. at 134-36.
157 Justice McReynolds filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Sutherland concurred.
Id at 163-75. He denied the existence of any special exception to the warrant requirement
for automobiles. Thus, the seizure could be justified only if it fell within the incident-to-arrest
exception, and that exception was inapplicable since "[t]he facts known when the arrest oc-
curred were wholly insufficient to engender reasonable belief that [the defendants] were com-
mitting a misdemeanor and the legality of the arrest cannot be supported by facts ascertained
through the search which followed." Id at 175.
158 Id at 147.
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are unreasonable."' 15 9 He formulated the "true rule" governing such
seizures: "[I]f the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon
probable cause, that is upon a belief reasonably arising out of circum-
stances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile . . .contains
that which by law is subject to seizure ... , the search and seizure are
valid."1
6 0
Applying this test, the Court upheld the validity of the Carroll
seizure. The Court emphasized the following factors as justifying the
search: the Carroll automobile was proceeding from the direction of
Detroit, which "is one of the most active centers for introducing illegally
into this country spiritous liquors"; the prohibition agents were con-
ducting a "regular patrol" along one of the main highways between De-
troit and Grand Rapids; the agents "had convincing evidence to make
them believe" that the Carroll defendants were "bootleggers" in Grand
Rapids; the agents had attempted to follow the defendants from Grand
Rapids to Detroit two months earlier; the defendants were travelling "in
the same automobile they had been in the night when they tried to fur-
nish the whiskey to the officers"; and the defendants "were coming from
the direction of the great source of supply for their stock to the place
• . .where they plied their trade."' 16 1 On the basis of these facts, the
Court concluded that the officers "had reasonable cause" for believing
that the defendants were carrying liquor."'
162
The Court distinguished the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement from the incident-to-arrest exception and expanded the
common law by allowing an officer to make warrantless arrests for mis-
demeanors committed in his presence. The traditional common law
rule allowed warrantless arrests only when a misdemeanor amounting to
a breach of peace was committed in the officer's presence, 163 but Carroll
dropped the breach of peace element. 164 On the basis of this reformula-
tion of the rule, the Carroll majority justified the arrest of the defendants.
Since the defendants were committing the misdemeanor of illegally
transporting intoxicating liquors in the presence of the prohibition
agents, the agents could arrest them without seeking a warrant.
159 Id
160 Id at 149.
161 d at 160. Detroit's position as a principal point of entry for liquor smuggled from
Canada was a matter of general knowledge. See, e.g., Selden, Rum Row in the Aiddle West, THE
TWENTiES: FORD, FLAPPERS & FANATICS 105 (G. Mowry ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as THE
TWENTIES].
162 267 U.S. at 160.
163 See general'y 9 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND §§ 523, 607-17 (1909); see aLso 3 AMERI-
CAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMMENTARIES ON TORTS 40-41 (1927) [hereinafter cited as ALI
COMMENTARIES]; Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REv. 541, 673-76, 703-04
(1924).
164 267 U.S. at 156-58; see F. BLACK, sufira note 30, at 31-32.
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The reasonableness standard established in Carroll was flexible, al-
lowing the Court to exclude evidence from searches found objectionable.
Gambino v. United States165 exemplifies the Court's use of this flexibility to
find a search violative of the fourth amendment. The government con-
tended that the search in Gambino was permissible under the Carroll test,
and that the factual information available to the officers was not insig-
nificant when compared to that available in Carroll.166 The Supreme
Court, however, did not even bother to compare the factual background
with that found sufficient in Carroll. Instead, the Court curtly dismissed
the government's contention "on the facts, which [the Court believed
were] unnecessary to detail."'
167
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's willingness to apply the Car-
roll standard more stringently in Gambino, the standard remained viable
throughout the prohibition era. As late as 1931, the Court reconfirmed
the automobile exception in Hust v. United States.'16  Justice Stone's
opinion for a unanimous Court invoked the Carroll rule to conclude that
the facts presented at the suppression hearing were sufficient to establish
probable cause. While the Court upheld the convictions of the Husoy
defendants, it refused to approve the rather harsh sentences that the
trial court had imposed under the Jones Act. It stopped short of finding
the Jones Act inapplicable, but it did remand the case to the district
court for resentencing.'
69
Although the Supreme Court never abandoned the automobile ex-
ception, the Court rebuffed an attempt to expand the exception to allow
searches of garages near the end of the prohibition era, when support for
prohibition had eroded. Taylor v. United States170 involved the nocturnal
search of a garage adjacent to the building where Taylor lived.' 7 ' The
Supreme Court found the search invalid and reversed the Taylor convic-
tions, without attempting to decide whether the garage constituted part
of the private dwelling.'
72
165 275 U.S. 311 (1927). See infra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
166 For a more detailed comparison of the facts known to the officers in Carbino with those
available in Carroll, see infra note 217 and accompanying text.
167 275 U.S. at 313.
168 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
169 Id at 703.
170 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
171 Having received complaints "over a period of about a year," a group of prohibition
agents decided to investigate the Taylor premises. As they approached the garage, they de-
tected the "odor of whiskey coming from within." Looking through "a small opening," they
saw a number of cardboard boxes "which they thought probably contained jars of whiskey,"
and so they broke the door fastening. After entering the garage, they found the 122 cases of
whiskey that formed the basis for Taylor's indictment. Id at 5-6.
172 The garage, which the Court described as "a small metal building," was located "on
the comer of a city lot and adjacent to the dwelling in which. . .Taylor resided." Id at 5.
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The Tavlor Court conceded that the agents had sufficient evidence
to obtain a search warrant. Nonetheless, it emphasized that the availa-
bility of such evidence does not allow officials to search a building with-
out obtaining a warrant.
1 73
The automobile cases like the prohibition cases generally, reflect
the Court's tendency to mirror public opinion. Carroll's sympathy to the
practical needs of enforcement is typical of the early prohibition
cases. 17 4 The Carroll opinion aided prohibition officials in two distinct
ways. 175 First, Carroll's recognition of an exemption from the search
warrant requirement in automobile cases obviously saved time. Fur-
thermore, the Carroll Court's willingness to find probable cause on mea-
ger evidence suggested that courts should avoid second-guessing the
judgment of officials whose suspicions about contraband proved to be
correct. Second, Carroll allowed officers to make arrests for misdemean-
ors that did not involve a breach of the peace. The American Law Insti-
tute's Commentaries on Torts acknowledged the novelty of the new
approach by observing that until the Carroll decision legal commenta-
tors agreed that "there was no privilege to arrest without warrant for a
misdemeanor other than breach of peace."'176 The Commentaries failed to
note that the Carroll reformulation was particularly useful in Volstead
Act cases. Since transportation of intoxicating liquors was a misde-
meanor until the passage of the Jones Act in 1929,177 and would not
amount to a breach of the peace, it would not, by itself, justify a war-
rantless arrest.
The only aspect of the Carroll decision that was not typical of the
general trend in prohibition cases was the lack of unanimity. As indi-
cated above, 78 dissents did not become common in prohibition cases
until the second half of the 1920s. The Carroll dissent is probably best
explained by the extremely sketchy showing that the majority was will-
ing to accept as adequate to demonstrate probable cause.179
Gambino, the one decision in the latter half of the 1920s, reflects the
Court's increasing ambivalence toward prohibition in that period. On
173 The Court also dismissed the incident-to-arrest exception as inapplicable because the
garage was empty when the agents entered it. Id at 6.
174 See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
175 For an index listing of automobile search cases from the prohibition era, see FEDERAL
DIGEST, Intoxicating Liquor § 249(g) (1941). For some extreme examples of overzealous en-
forcement, see F. BLACK, supra note 30, at 52-57.
176 3 ALI COMMENTARIES, supra note 163, at 40.
177 See Pub. L. No. 70-899, 45 Stat. 1446 (1929) (repealed 1935) (Jones Act); Pub. L. No.
66-66, § 29, 41 Stat. 316 (1919) (repealed 1933) (Section 29 of Title II of the Volstead Act).
178 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
179 See 267 U.S. at 171-74 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); see also F. BLACK, supra note 30, at
45-47; H. McBAIN, PROHIBr1oN: LEGAL AND ILLEGAL 85-86 (1928).
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the one hand, Gambino demonstrates the Court's willingness to apply the
Carroll test stringently in a case involving a Volstead Act violation that
was relatively minor. 80 At the same time, Gambino also manifests the
caution characteristic of the decisions rendered in the middle third of
the prohibition era. Although the Gambino Court did not modify the
Carroll test for automobile searches, it found the evidentiary showing
insufficient in the later case.
By the time the Court decided Taylor in 1932, it had returned to a
"liberal" construction of the fourth amendment even when that con-
struction resulted in freeing some relatively serious offenders.',"
Notwithstanding the serious nature of the defendant's violation-agents
seized 122 cases of whiskey from Taylor's garage-the Court emphati-
cally reasserted the need for a warrant to search any building and re-
jected any lesser standard for structures not used as dwellings.
8 2
Husy, the other automobile decision of the 1930s, seems initially to
contradict the thesis of this article. Near the end of the prohibition era,
Hus upheld the validity of an automobile search, and the Supreme
Court gave no consideration to whether Carroll should be overruled in
light of changing attitudes toward prohibition. The Court simply ac-
cepted Carroll as stating the applicable rule, and the only search issue
that received any significant consideration was the issue of whether the
officials had sufficient information to support a probable cause finding.
Since the factual information known to the investigators was considera-
bly greater than in Carroll, the Court affirmed the conviction.
What Husty suggests is that one aspect of legal ideology, the reluc-
tance to overrule existing precedents, operated as a significant internal
limit on the Supreme Court's doctrinal response to changing attitudes
about prohibition. Together with Go-Bart and Lekowitz, 83 Gambino
demonstrated that the Court was willing to go to great lengths to distin-
guish early prohibition decisions. Yet in none of those cases did the
Court expressly consider overruling an earlier opinion, and reluctance to
overrule was typical of both the Taft and Hughes courts.' 84 In Hustp,
the Court confronted a case that it was unable to distinguish from a
decision rendered at the very beginning of the prohibition era. In that
180 Record at 19, Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 311 (1927).
181 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
182 One must, of course, concede that Ta7ylor was an easy case, for the Solicitor General
essentially asked for the reversal by advising the Court that, in his opinion, the search was
illegal. 286 U.S. at 5.
183 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
184 See A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 15-16,50 (1968 ed.); 1
W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 224-25 (1969); 2
id at 37-38 (1970).
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situation, it adhered to the earlier precedent, although it did manage to
find a way to send the case back for resentencing.
C. COOPERATION WITH NONFEDERAL INVESTIGATORS
Prior to the prohibition era, Supreme Court decisions had con-
firmed that the fourth amendment applied only to searches by federal
officials.185 They established the so-called "silver platter" doctrine,
which in federal criminal trials allowed the use of evidence obtained by
non-federal investigators in searches that would have violated the fourth
amendment if conducted by federal officials.186 Weeks applied this rule
to evidence obtained by state officials'in a search conducted prior to the
federal search that Weeks declared invalid.'8 7 Similarly, Burdeau v. Mc-
Dowell' 88 applied the silver platter doctrine to evidence obtained in a
search by private citizens.
Of course, mere participation by state officials or private citizens
did not transform a search conducted by federal officials into a
nonfederal search. In fact, several lower court decisions early in the pro-
hibition era applied the sanctions of the fourth amendment to searches
conducted jointly by federal prohibition agents and state (or local) of-
ficers.18 9 However, none of these cases challenged the basic rule that
evidence obtained by nonfederal investigators was admissible regardless
of the means by which it was obtained, and the Supreme Court summa-
rily confirmed the rule in a one-sentence per curiam opinion during the
1924 term.' 90
Two Supreme Court decisions rendered during the middle years of
the prohibition era reflected increased willingness to apply the fourth
amendment to searches conducted by state officials with limited federal
involvement. Byars v. United States19 ruled that the ban on unreasonable
185 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); National Safe Dep't Co. v. Stead, 232
U.S. 58, 71 (1914). See also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Ohio exrel. Lloyd v.
Dollison, 194 U.S. 445, 447 (1904).
186 The "silver platter" appellation apparently originated in a concurring opinion of Jus-
tice Frankfurter. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949). See generally Grant, The
Tarnished Silver Platter Federalism and Admission oflllegally Seized Evidence, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1
(1961). The Court finally overruled the silver platter doctrine in 1960. Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960).
187 232 U.S. at 386.
188 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
189 E.g., In re Schuetze, 299 F. 827 (W.D.N.Y. 1924); United States v. Falloco, 277 F. 75
(W.D. Mo. 1922); cf United States v. Bush, 269 F. 455 (W.D.N.Y. 1920) (arrest by city police
does not preclude inquiry into prior search conducted by federal agents). But see Comment,
The Meaning ofthe Federal Rule on Evidence Illegally Obtained, 36 YALE L.J. 536, 538-39 (1927)
(summary of cases refusing to find joint action).
190 Center v. United States, 267 U.S. 575 (1925). For a brief description of the Center facts,
see Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 311, 317 (1927).
191 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
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searches applied to a search where the federal prohibition agent's in-
volvement began after local police officers had secured a search warrant
from a state court. In the following term, Gambino v. United States t92 held
the amendment applicable to a search conducted by state officials
"solely" for the benefit of the federal government.
In Byars, a state court issued a search warrant authorizing local po-
lice officers to search Byars' home. At the request of the officer in charge
of the search, a federal prohibition agent accompanied the police officers
and assisted in the search. The search uncovered "counterfeit strip
stamps of the kind used on whiskey bottled in bond." The federal agent
confiscated the stamps, and they formed the basis for the prosecution
and conviction of Byars.'
93
The Supreme Court reversed Byars' conviction in a unanimous
opinion by Justice Sutherland. The federal prohibition agent's partici-
pation as a federal enforcement officer prompted the reversal. 194 Two
facts were essential: the police officer specifically asked a federal official
whom he knew to be a prohibition agent to accompany him; and all of
the stamps, "which were not within the purview of the state search war-
rant,. . . . were surrendered to the exclusive possession of the federal
agent-a practical concession that he was there in his federal charac-
ter."' 95 Because the federal official thus participated "under color of his
federal office," the search assumed the character of "a joint operation of
the local and federal officers."'
196
192 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
193 273 U.S. at 30-32. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Byars' conviction. 4 F.2d 507 (8th Cir.
1925), rev'd, 273 U.S. 28 (1927). Although the court acknowledged that the warrant would
have been invalid if evaluated by federal standards, id.; accord, 273 U.S. at 29, it nonetheless
admitted into evidence the stamps that were seized on the ground that the fourth amendment
did not apply to searches by nonfederal investigators. According to the court of appeals, the
underlying rule was clear: "[I]n order that the government may be bound by the action of
the state officers, the search must have been initiated by government officers or government
officers must have so far participated in that search as to make it in effect a federal undertak-
ing." 4 F.2d at 508. Applying that rule in Byars, the court found insufficient federal involve-
ment since state officers planned the raid, without the assistance or knowledge of the federal
prohibition agent, and the expedition was brought to the federal agent's notice only when it
was about to start.
The court of appeals insisted that sustaining Byars' conviction would have required a
considerable broadening of the rule concerning the extent of federal participation necessary
to make a search a federal undertaking. In effect, it would have required a holding "that, no
matter how incidentally a government officer happens to be present, or to take part as a
citizen in a state proceeding, that happening automatically converts a state search into a
government proceeding." Since state officials had seized part of the evidence, "[that] part, in
any view, [was] free from any participation on the part of the prohibition agent, unless his
presence converted the entire search into a federal, as distinguished from a state, undertak-
ing." Id
194 273 U.S. at 32.
195 d at 32-33.
196 Id at 33.
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Notwithstanding its willingness to find federal participation suffi-
cient to trigger the fourth amendment in Byars, the Court included two
important qualifications. First, the Court emphasized "that the mere
participation in a state search by one who is a federal officer does not
render it a federal undertaking."' 197 Something more was required, that
the federal official participate "under color of his federal office" or "in
his federal character." 198 Second, Byars reaffirmed the basic silver plat-
ter doctrine recognized by Weeks; it refused to "question the right of the
federal government to avail itself of evidence improperly seized by state
officers operating entirely upon their own account." 199
The Supreme Court returned to the task of distinguishing state and
federal searches in the term following the Byars decision. Gambino ex-
cluded evidence seized by state officials without the active assistance of
any federal officers, because the state officials conducted the search
"solely" for the benefit of the federal government.
To understand Gambino, one must appreciate the atypical New
York experience in the prohibition era. Although New York initially
passed a state enforcement statute after the eighteenth amendment was
ratified, the legislature repealed the state act just two years later. 200 The
governor signed the repeal measure, however, only after he formally ad-
vised the legislature that the state police would continue to cooperate in
enforcing the Volstead Act in New York.20 1 As a result of this policy of
cooperation, New York police authorities continued to apprehend viola-
tors of the Volstead Act and to conduct searches as part of their enforce-
ment efforts. 2
0 2
Gambino involved a search of the defendant's automobile by two
New York state troopers.20 3 Justice Brandeis' opinion for a unanimous
Court held the fourth amendment applicable even though "[n]o Federal
official was present at the search and seizure" and the defendants offered
no evidence indicating that the "search and seizure were made in coop-
eration with federal officials. ' 20 4 The Court based its decision on the
finding "that the state troopers believed that they were required by law
197 Id at 32.
198 Id at 33.
199 Id
200 1923 N.Y. Laws 871 (repealed 1925).
201 275 U.S. at 314-16.
202 Id at 315 n.2. See also Comment, Prohibition Searches by New York State Police, 37 YALE
L.J. 784, 785 (1928) ("[A]Ithough the [New York] enforcement [statute] has been repealed,
the United States attorneys have generally based their prosecutions upon evidence secured by
local police.").
203 For a description of the factual circumstances involved in the search, see inara note 225
and accompanying text.
204 275 U.S. at 315.
[Vol. 73
PROHIBITION
to aid in enforcing the [Volstead] Act" and "in the performance of that
supposed duty" they conducted the Gambino search "solely for the pur-
pose of aiding in the federal prosecution. '205 According to Justice Bran-
deis, the subsequent federal prosecution was, "in effect, a ratification of
the arrest, search and seizure made by the troopers on behalf of the
United States. ' 20 6 This ratification sufficiently involved the federal gov-
ernment to bring the fourth amendment into play.
Gambino was the last Supreme Court decision to address the cooper-
ation issue during the prohibition era. Although one commentator ob-
served that "[i]t would be but a short step from the Gambino case to hold
that the constitutional guarantees of [the fourth and fifth] amendments
restrict the activities of state agencies generally, ' 20 7 the Supreme Court
did not take that step until long after prohibition.20 Nor did the lower
courts expand the Byars-Gambino rules in subsequent prohibition cases.
Only occasionally did they apply fourth amendment standards to
searches in which the federal involvement was significant.209 When the
federal involvement was minimal, lower courts continued to apply the
silver platter doctrine until the end of the prohibition era.
2 10
At first glance, these decisions might seem inconsistent with the
general pattern of decisions, for they are less ambivalent than other deci-
sions of the middle years. Byars and Gambino, for example, can easily be
contrasted with Olmstead and Marron; the cooperation cases actually re-
versed convictions and did not merely reflect some general misgivings.
That analysis, however, ignores two crucial features of the coopera-
tion cases. First, Bars and Gambino involved relatively modest violations
when compared with the large quantities of liquor seized in Marron or
the huge smuggling operation involved in Olmstead. When police exe-
cuted the Byars search warrant, they found neither intoxicating liquor
nor any liquor manufacturing equipment: They only discovered a
handful of counterfeited bonding stamps of the type used for bonded
whiskey.21' Similarly, the Gambino search uncovered only fourteen cases
205 Id The Court declined to determine "[w]hether the laws of the state actually imposed
on the troopers the duty of aiding the Federal officials in the enforcement of the. . . Act."
Id at 317.
206 Id at 317.
207 Comment, supra note 202, at 789.
208 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
209 E.g., Crank v. United States, 61 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1932); Hall v. United States, 41 F.2d
54 (9th Cir. 1930); United States v. DeBousi, 32 F.2d 902 (W.D. Mass. 1929).
210 E.g., Aldridge v. United States, 67 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1933); United States v. Myers, 46
F.2d 317 (M.D. Penn. 1931); United States v. Walker, 41 F.2d 538 (E.D. Tenn. 1930).
211 Large scale bootleggers often had much larger quantities of stamps. See H. ASBURY,
supra note 4, at 275 (describing the seizure of "more than eight hundred thousand liquor




of ale in the defendant's automobile. Further, neither decision necessar-
ily precluded prosecution of offenders. Cambino was a decision with lim-
ited applicability, for only six other states joined New York in repealing
their state enforcement statutes,212 and the rationale did not apply to
searches by state officials in states with their own prohibition enforce-
ment laws. Moreover, states were still free to use evidence obtained in
joint state-federal searches in state trials.
213
Thus, the Byars and Gambino decisions seem fully consistent with the
trend of decisions in the middle years of prohibition. Relatively minor
offenders were released while serious offenders could be punished in the
vast majority of states that maintained state enforcement statutes.
Byars and Gambino were the only prohibition era Supreme Court
decisions on nonfederal cooperation with federal investigators, but the
lower federal courts continued to struggle with the problem during the
prohibition era. Although the evidence is far from conclusive, decisions
of the district courts and courts of appeal suggest that the lower federal
courts shared the Supreme Court's increasing concern over the methods
of prohibition enforcement. As one would expect, the lower court deci-
sions reflect less innovation when modifying judicial rules. Nonetheless,
in the final years of prohibition the lower courts were willing to apply
federal standards to "joint" searches.214 Moreover, in several of the
post-Gambino decisions finding insufficient the extent of federal involve-
ment, the facts indicate that the search would have satisfied fourth
amendment standards in any event.2
15
D. THE PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIREMENT
In Carroll, one of the early prohibition cases, the Supreme Court
applied the fourth amendment's requirement that search warrants issue
only "upon probable cause" to warrantless searches of automobiles.
The question of what constituted "probable cause" was therefore fre-
quently litigated, and the Supreme Court dealt with the question
throughout the prohibition era.
212 See A. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 196. As late as 1930, only four states had repealed
their enforcement statutes.
213 However, the number of states adopting the exclusionary rule as a matter of state law
increased significantly during the prohibition era. See Andrews, Historical Survf of the Law of
Searches and Seizures, 34 LAW NOTES 42, 46 (1930); Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of
Search and Seizure, 13 MINN. L. REv. 1, 2-6 (1928); Comment, supra note 189, at 537 n.2.
214 See Crank v. United States, 61 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1932); Hall v. United States, 41 F.2d
54 (9th Cir. 1930); United States v. DeBousi, 32 F.2d 902 (W.D. Mass. 1929).
215 E.g., Aldridge v. United States, 67 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1933); United States v. Walker,
41 F.2d 538 (E.D. Tenn. 1930); United States v. One Ox-5 American Eagle Airplane, 38 F.2d
106 (W.D. Wash. 1930). But see Miller v. United States, 50 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1930) (evidence
seized by state officers in warrantless search of building held admissible).
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By the time of prohibition, the Court had developed a reasonable-
ness test for probable cause that it applied in challenges to warrants and
warrantless searches throughout the prohibition era. The commonly in-
voked formulation of the test came from a nineteenth century decision:
"If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant
a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been
committed, it is sufficient.
'216
Despite the formal consistency in the Supreme Court's definition of
probable cause in prohibition-era cases, analysis of the facts of the cases
reveals an uneven application of the definition. The Court imposed an
increasingly stringent probable cause requirement as the years passed.
Carroll was the first of the probable cause decisions during the pro-
hibition. The Court found that the officers had "reasonable cause" for
believing the defendants were "carrying liquor" on the basis of five fac-
tors: (1) the prohibition agents' observation of the defendants as they
were headed from the direction of "one of the nation's most active cen-
ters for introducing illegally into this country spirituous liquor"; (2) the
availability of "convincing evidence" (never described in the opinion)
which made the agents believe that the defendants were bootleggers;
(3) the agents' aborted attempt to follow the defendants into Detroit
two months earlier; (4) the defendants' use of the automobile used two
and one-half months earlier when they had offered but failed to provide
the agents with alcoholic beverages; and (5) the direction of the defend-
ants' travel, from "the great source of [their liquor] supply . . . to the
place. . . where they plied their trade. '217 Relying only on this sparse
evidence, the Court required no particular evidence indicating that the
defendants were-carrying liquor on the day in question. The facts relied
upon would have existed anytime the defendants were traveling from
the direction of Detroit toward Grand Rapids in the particular automo-
bile they were using.
The probable cause issue also surfaced in two other 1925 decisions.
In both cases, the Court found the facts sufficient to establish probable
cause, although neither upheld the validity of a search based on evi-
dence as flimsy as that offered in Carroll.
The principal issue in Steele v. United States (Steele 1) 218 was the ade-
quacy of the warrant's description of the place to be searched. However,
the defendants also argued that the magistrate improperly issued the
warrant since the prohibition agents had not sufficiently established
probable cause. In contrast to Carroll, Steele I was a simple case. A pro-
216 267 U.S. at 161 (quoting Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1879)).
217 267 U.S. at 160.
218 267 U.S. 498 (1925).
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hibition agent had observed workers unloading cases with the word
"whiskey" on them. Based on this testimony, the Supreme Court dis-
missed the probable cause issue, concluding that the prohibition agent's
observations were sufficient to support a probable cause finding.
21 9
The evidence of probable cause was more equivocal in Dumbra v.
United States,220 although it was certainly stronger than the evidence in
Carroll. The Dumbra defendants owned a winery that had a permit to
produce wine for non-beverage purposes, and they also owned a grocery
store adjacent to the winery. At the grocery store, prohibition agents
purchased wine they observed being carried from the winery.
22 1
As in Steele I, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the conten-
tion that the agents lacked probable cause to make the seizures in the
winery.22 2 The Court reasoned that the facts submitted to the magis-
trate "lead to the inference that the suspected premises were the source
of supply" and thus "gave rise to a reasonable belief that the liquors...
[in the winery] were possessed for the purpose and with the intent of
selling them unlawfully to casual purchasers.
'22 3
Gambizo was the only probable cause decision during the middle
years of prohibition.224 It adhered to the Carroll probable cause formu-
lation in a warrantless search of an automobile but found the officers
lacked probable cause. The opinion is enigmatic; the Court merely an-
nounced its conclusion without explaining why the facts known to the
investigating officers were insufficient. Nonetheless, the record indicates
that the Court applied the Carroll standard in a more stringent fashion,
since the information which officers had was at least as strong as the
evidence employed by the Carroll court to uphold the probable cause
finding.2
25
219 Id at 504. The investigation leading to the Steele warrant was conducted by Isidor
Eistein and Moe Smith, probably the two most celebrated prohibition agents in the country.
See H. ASBURY, supra note 4, at 211-13; C. MERZ, supra note 4, at 135-37; Talley, Einstein, Rum
Sleuth, THE TWENTIES, supra note 161, at 107.
220 268 U.S. 435 (1925).
221 To secure a warrant authorizing a search of the grocery store and winery and seizure of
any intoxicating liquor possessed in violation of the Volstead Act, the prohibition agents ad-
vised the United States Commissioner about the purchases but neglected to mention that the
winery had a valid permit.
222 The Court did criticize the agents' failure to disclose to the magistrate that the defend-
ants had a permit to manufacture wines for nonbeverage purposes. 268 U.S. at 438.
223 Id at 441.
224 275 U.S. 311 (1927).
225 Two experienced prohibition agents observed the defendants' car about eleven miles
from the border traveling away from Canada on a road that was frequently used by bootleg-
gers. The rear end of the defendants' car "hung pretty low," suggesting to the officers that
"[t]here was a load of booze." The officers followed the defendants to a nearby village, where
the defendants stopped the car and got out to go into a garage owned by an individual who
had "a reputation of being a bootlegger." After a brief conversation with the defendants, the
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During the final years of the prohibition era, the Court continued
to apply the probable cause requirement rather strictly, especially when
reviewing search warrant cases.226 The best example of this strict review
is Grau v. United States,227 in which the Court found the facts presented to
the magistrate insufficient to establish probable cause. Grau involved a
provision of the Volstead Act limiting the right to search private dwell-
ings in enforcing prohibition. Under the Act, a magistrate could issue
search warrants for private dwellings only when prohibition agents had
probable cause to believe either that intoxicating liquor was being sold
on the premises or that the residence was "in part used for some business
purpose such as a store, shop, saloon, restaurant, hotel, or boarding
house. '' 228 For any other type of building, probable cause to believe
that any offense under the Act was being committed was sufficient to
authorize issuance of the warrant.
229
The issue in Grau was whether evidence that large quantities of in-
toxicating liquor were being manufactured in a dwelling could consti-
tute probable cause to infer a selling operation. According to the
affidavit for the warrant, the affiant saw people haul cans commonly
used in hauling whiskey up to the dwelling, and then haul similar con-
tainers away from it, apparently heavily loaded. He also "smelled odors
and fumes of cooking mash coming from the place," from which he con-
cluded that "there [was] a still and whiskey mash on the premises." 230
After the United States Commissioner issued a warrant, prohibition
agents seized a still and 350 gallons of whiskey.
The Supreme Court reversed Grau's conviction in a unanimous
opinion by Justice Roberts. 23' The Court criticized the Sixth Circuit's
officers searched the automobile and discovered fourteen cases of ale. Record at 19, Gambino
v. United States, 275 U.S. 311 (1927).
226 See Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41
(1930).
227 287 U.S. 124 (1932).
228 Volstead Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 315 (repealed 1935).
229 Id
230 287 U.S. at 127. The affidavit did not describe the place to be searched as a residence.
231 56 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1932), revzd, 287 U.S. 124 (1932). The court of appeals relied on
one of its earlier precedents which held that the Act's provision allowing dwellings to be
searched for sale offenses only was "satisfied by an affidavit establishing probable cause for
the charge that the premises are being used for the prosecution of commercial sales, involving
not only manufacture, but storage, delivery to purchasers, the filling of orders, and, generally
the maintenance of the premises to be searched as a headquarters for supervising a selling
business." Id at 781 (citing Kasprowicz v. United States, 20 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1927)). In
adopting this rationale for its decision, the court of appeals deliberately avoided "the question
whether the manufacture of intoxicating liquor in large quantities in a dwelling house may be
of such commercial character as to justify a search warrant on the theory that the dwelling is
used in part for a business purpose." 56 F.2d at 781.
Judged by this standard, the court concluded that the Grau affidavit was sufficient to
establish probable cause to believe that the dwelling was "being used for the unlawful sale of
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"broad construction" of the Act, through which it found the allegations
adequate to warrant a belief that the dwelling was being used as the
headquarters for a merchandising effort. According to Mr. Justice Rob-
erts, such a construction "unduly narrow[ed] the guaranties of the
Fourth Amendment, in consonance with which the statute was passed,"
and it thereby conflicted with the rule that fourth amendment protec-
tions are to be liberally construed.
2 32
Justice Roberts declared that the Grau warrant should be judged by
the reasonableness standard. 233 He concluded that "[w]hile a dwelling
used as a manufactory or headquarters for merchandising may well be
and doubtless often is the place of sale, its use for those purposes is not
alone probable cause for believing that actual sales are there made.
'234
Of course, the Court's application of a stricter standard of probable
cause does not mean that the Supreme Court struck down every search.
Nonetheless, the cases in which the Court did find an adequate showing
of probable cause were supported by considerable evidence.
Huso provides an example of such a case. As described above,
235
Huso reaffirmed the Carroll rule allowing warrantless searches of private
automobiles when supported by probable cause. The Court held that
the facts known to the officers in the particular case were adequate;
however, the factual showing was quite substantial. One of the prohibi-
tion agents involved in the Huso search "testified that he had known
Husty to be a 'bootlegger' for a number of years," that he had arrested
Husty on two earlier occasions for violating the Volstead Act, and that
both arrests had resulted in convictions. On the day the search oc-
curred, an informant advised the agent that Husty "had two loads of
liquor in automobiles of a particular make and description, parked in
particular places on named streets." The prohibition officer had known
the informant "for about eight years," and on prior occasions, the in-
formant had given the officers "similar information" that had proved
reliable. When the officers proceeded to one of the locations the inform-
ant had named, they found one of the described automobiles unat-
tended. They later observed the Huspy defendants get into the car.
After Husty started the car, the agents stopped him and conducted the
intoxicating liquor." Id "One does not," the court noted, "manufacture liquor for his own
use in such quantities as to require wholesale deliveries of. . . [the] ingredients of mash"; nor
does whiskey manufactured for personal use ordinarily involve shipment "from the premises
in cans, by automobile or truck loads" or the return of cans for refilling. Id Since the Grau
affidavits contained such allegations, they were "clearly adapted to warrant the belief that the
dwelling [was] being used as headquarters for the merchandising of liquor." Id
232 Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. at 128.
233 Id
234 Id at 128-29.
235 See su ira notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
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search that uncovered eighteen cases of whiskey.236
The factual showing in Husy provides a vivid contrast to that made
in Carroll, the case that originated the probable cause test applied in
Hus,. When the Court decided Carroll at the very beginning of the
prohibition era, it permitted the warrantless search of an automobile on
little more than a suspicion that the vehicle's occupants were bootleg-
gers.237 By the time that Husty was decided in 1931, however, the Court
approved the search only after the introduction of much more substan-
tial evidence that the automobile to be searched contained intoxicating
liquors.
The prohibition decisions that address the probable cause issue il-
lustrate that although the formulation of the probable cause 'standard
remained constant, the Court's application of the rule shifted substan-
tially. The early cases consistently found probable cause, even in cases
where factual support for the finding was minimal. In the middle years,
the Court required a greater showing of probable cause in a case involv-
ing a warrantless automobile search that uncovered a relatively minor
violation. Finally, towards the end of the prohibition, Grau applied the
probable cause standard restrictively to a search warrant, in a case in-
volving an operation of commercial dimensions. Yet despite the increas-
ingly strict application of the reasonableness standard, the Court never
abandoned the standard itself; Hust , indicates that the Court remained
willing to find probable cause when presented with a strong factual basis
for doing so.
E. WARRANT REQUIREMENTS
The language of the fourth amendment imposes two limits on the
issuance of warrants: the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized must be particularly described, and probable cause to issue
the warrant must be supported by oath or affirmation. In addition, the
Volstead Act added a host of statutory requirements applicable to war-
rants issued for prohibition searches. 238 This subsection analyzes
Supreme Court decisions construing and applying these constitutional
and statutory restrictions.
One statutory issue litigated fairly early in the prohibition era was
whether prohibition agents were authorized to execute warrants issued
236 282 U.S. 694, 700 (1931).
237 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
238 The Volstead Act incorporated the procedural requirements of the Espionage Act, ch.
30, 40 Stat. 228 (1917), by reference. Volstead Act, ch. 85, § 3, 41 Stat. 308 (repealed 1935).
See also id at 315 (Section 25 of Title II allowing private dwellings to be searched only when




under the Volstead Act. Under the Act, a magistrate issued a warrant
"to a civil officer of the United States. '239 The Constitution employs a
similar phrase, "[o]fficers of the United States," in a manner that ex-
cludes prohibition agents,24° and earlier Supreme Court decisions had
indicated that, "when employed in the statutes of the United States,"
the constitutional phrase is "usually [taken] to have the limited constitu-
tional meaning.
'24 1
Notwithstanding the superficial appeal of this semantic argument,
the early decision of United States v. Steele (Steele II) 242 concluded that a
prohibition agent was a person to whom warrants could properly be
directed under the statute. Chief Justice Taft insisted that the Court
had occasionally "given [the phrase] an enlarged meaning,"2 4 3 and he
found such an enlarged construction justified in the warrant context be-
cause the purpose of the statutory phrase was to require "that the person
designated shall be a civil and not a military agent of the
government.
'244
In Steele 1245 the Supreme Court considered the constitutional re-
quirement that the warrant particularly describe the place to be
searched. The warrant attacked in Steele I authorized the search of a
building described as "the garage located in the building at 611 West
46th Street," together with "any building or rooms connected or used in
connection with said garage." 246 The building searched was a four story
building that housed two related businesses, Indian Head Auto Truck
Service and Indian Head Storage Warehouse. Even though the busi-
nesses had separate street addresses (No. 609 and No. 611), the Supreme
Court concluded that "the garage business covering the whole first floor
and the storage business above were of such a character and so related
239 Espionage Act, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 229 (1917). This provision was incorporated by refer-
ence from the Espionage Act. See note 238 supra.
240 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (even "inferior" officers must be appointed by the President,
the courts or department heads).
241 Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505, 507 (1925) (Steele II) (citing Burnap v. United
States, 252 U.S. 512 (1920)); United States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 525 (1888); United States v.
Mouat, 124 U.S. 303 (1888).
242 267 U.S. 505 (1925).
243 Id at 507.
244 Id To support this interpretation of the Act, the Court emphasized three arguments:
(1) the restrictive interpretation would exclude many persons who would otherwise satisfy
the Espionage Act's language, that the person to whom the warrant is issued shall be one
"duly authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing any law of the United States"; (2) the use of
similar phrases in various parts of the Volstead Act in circumstances that support the broader
construction; and (3) the negative implication of the provision in the Volstead Act making it
a misdemeanor for a prohibition agent to search a dwelling without a warrant. Id
245 Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925) (Steele I), was a companion case that
involved the same individual whose conviction was affirmed in Steele II.
246 Id at 500.
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• . . that there was no real division in fact or in use of the building into
separate halves.
'247
In executing the warrant, the prohibition agents searched the entire
building. They seized large quantities of liquor from the 611 side of the
building, listed in the warrant, as well as from the 609 side of the build-
ing, not specifically mentioned in the warrant.
2 4 8
Chief Justice Taft's opinion for a unanimous Court summarily dis-
missed the suggestion that the description in the warrant was inade-
quate to justify the search. The Chief Justice found that the warrant
indicated the whole building as the place to be searched.24 9 All that was
required, the Chief Justice emphasized, was a sufficient description so
"that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascer-
tain and identify the place intended.
'250
Nor did the Chief Justice find any merit in the suggestion that the
search went "too far. ' 25 1 The affiants received permission to search any
building or rooms connected with or used in connection with the garage,
and thus the search was justified because "the elevator of the garage
connected it with every floor and room in the building and was intended
to be used with it.
'
"252
Steele I was the only Supreme Court decision that attempted to de-
fine the precision with which the warrant must describe the premises to
be searched. Two cases decided during the middle years of prohibition,
however, raised a related issue: the need for a description of the items to
be seized. Both were less sympathetic to enforcement authorities than
Steele I.
The description issue surfaced directly in Marron when agents exe-
cuting a valid search warrant discovered incriminating evidence not spe-
cifically named in the warrant. The Maron Court ultimately sustained
the legality of the search as incident to a lawful arrest.253 Nonetheless, it
adopted a rather strict approach to the description requirement. De-
247 Id at 502-03. The building contained three entrances: "One on the 609 side, which
[was] used, and which [led] to a staircase running up to the four floors"; a similar staircase on
the 611 side, which was closed; and, in the middle of the building, "an automobile entrance
... into a garage and opposite to the entrance... an elevator reaching to the four stories."
Id at 502.
248 From the third floor on the 609 side of the building, they seized "150 cases of whiskey,
92 bags of whiskey, and one five-gallon can of alcohol"; and from the second floor of that side,
"33 cases of gin." On the second floor of the 611 side, they seized "six 5-gallon jugs of whis-
key, 33 cases of gin, 102 quarts of whiskey, ... two 50-gallon barrels of whiskey, and a





253 See sufira notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
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claring that the purpose of the requirement was to ensure that "nothing
is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant, '254 it found
that the search warrant used by the officer did not allow the seizure of
the goods involved. Without explanation, Marron avoided two obvious
methods for introducing flexibility into the warrant execution:
(1) broadly construing the warrant language which covered "intoxicat-
ing liquors and articles for their manufacture," to include items associ-
ated with the disposal of illegally manufactured liquor and thus to cover
the ledger and bills seized; or (2) fashioning an incident-to-warrant ex-
ception paralleling the rule permitting the seizure of items discovered
pursuant to a valid arrest.
Byars manifested a'similarly rigid construction of warrant language,
even though the Court never explicitly discussed the description issue.
The state warrant involved in Byars authorized seizure of "instruments
and materials used in the manufacture of such [intoxicating] liquor,
2 55
and the items seized were counterfeit bonding stamps, the most obvious
use for which was to give bootleg whiskey the appearance of a reputable
brand.256 Nonetheless, the Byars opinion dismissed the applicability of
the warrant with the dogmatic assertion that its language did not cover
the items seized.
During the final years of prohibition, the Court strictly construed
both statutory and constitutional provisions governing warrants. For
example, Grau introduced, in almost off-hand dictum, a new procedural
safeguard requiring a warrant to be supported by "evidence which
would be competent in the trial of the offense before a jury.
'
"257
Two subsequent decisions displayed similarly strict attitudes to-
ward procedural requirements. In Sgro v. United States,258 the Court re-
fused to allow a magistrate to "reissue" a warrant when the warrant's
ten-day period of validity 259 had expired. Explicitly embracing the lib-
eral rule of construction for fourth amendment rights announced in the
pre-prohibition cases, 260 the Court emphasized that the statutes imposed
certain conditions that had to be satisfied. A magistrate could not es-
cape those conditions "by describing the action as a reissue" of an earlier
254 275 U.S. at 196.
255 273 U.S. at 29. The actual holding of Byars is described in greater detail in the text
accompanying notes 193-99 supra.
256 See H. ASBURY, supra note 4, at 274-75.
257 287 U.S. at 128. For contemporaneous criticism of this dictum, see Note, The Probable
Cause Requirementfor Search Warrants, 46 HARv. L. REV. 1307, 1310-11 (1933).
258 287 U.S. 206 (1932).
259 The ten-day limit was included in Section 11 of Title XI of the Espionage Act, ch. 30,
40 Stat. 229 (1917), which was incorporated into the Volstead Act by reference. See supra note
238.
260 287 U.S. at 210, 211.
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warrant. Similarly, Nathanson v. United States261 held that the fourth
amendment requires that the affidavit presented to the magistrate be
based on "facts or circumstances" within the affiant's knowledge.
"Mere affirmance of belief or suspicion," the Court asserted, was "not
enough.
'262
The warrant cases address a wider array of issues than do the cases
in the other doctrinal subcategories discussed above. Nevertheless, when
considered as a group, they demonstrate a similar pattern. The early
cases, Steele I and II, uniformly supported the government's position. In
Marron and Byars, the decisions of the middle years, the Court became
more critical of prohibition enforcement techniques, but not to the point
of allowing serious violators to go free.2 63 Finally, in the last years of
national prohibition, the Court resurrected the pre-prohibition rule call-
ing for liberal construction of the fourth amendment. During this pe-
riod, Grau introduced a new procedural rule by way of dictum, Sgro
construed a federal statute to deny magistrates discretion to reissue war-
rants, and Nathanson introduced an actual-knowledge element into the
fourth amendment's affidavit requirement.
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE AT THE END OF THE
PROHIBITION ERA
Analysis of the fourth amendment cases at the repeal of prohibition
reveals two dramatic changes in the nature of fourth amendment
problems. First, fourth amendment doctrine became more complex
during the prohibition era. Second, the cases increasingly involved fac-
tual circumstances not easily analyzed in terms of the "home" and "pa-
pers" categories that dominated the cases decided before 1920.2
64
The most obvious change is the increased complexity of fourth
amendment doctrine. By the end of the prohibition era, an assortment
of new exceptions, qualifications, and refinements abound. In effect, the
Court had molded a rather limited group of precedents into a detailed
body of doctrine that has retained its basic structure to the present.
265
261 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
262 Id at 47. Although the Volstead Act contained an oath or affirmation requirement, the
statutory requirement did not apply in Nathanson because the search was conducted by a
customs agent pursuant to a warrant issued by a state judge. Id at 44-45. The customs agent
had, however, received his information "from prohibition officials and from an unnamed
informer." Nathanson v. United States, 63 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1933), reV', 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
263 Maron, the conviction that the Supreme Court affirmed, involved a saloon-type opera-
tion that was apparently open to the public, see supra note 122 and accompanying text. By
contrast, the defendant whose conviction was overturned in Bars had a relatively modest
collection of counterfeit banding stamps. See supra notes 191, 211 and accompanying text.
264 See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
265 Although not limited to Supreme Court cases, secondary sources confirm the extent to
1982]
KENNETH M MURCHISON [Vol. 73
The Court contributed to the growth of doctrinal complexity in
two ways. One was to create new doctrinal categories by holding that
the fourth amendment's protection of the home does not extend to
"open fields," 266 that the amendment does not apply to the tapping of
telephone conversations, 267 and that the warrant requirement does not
apply to automobile searches. 2 6 8  More commonly, the Court refined
subcategories that had remained undeveloped in pre-prohibition cases.
For example, the Court expanded the common law of arrest 269 and
struggled to define the scope of warrantless searches conducted incident
to such arrests. 270 It also defined the degree of federal involvement nec-
essary to apply the fourth amendment to searches conducted in whole or
in part by state or local officers; 27 1 it struggled to explain and to apply
the probable cause standard in a variety of circumstances; 272 and it gave
content to statutory and constitutional provisions governing the issuance
of search warrants.
273
which the content of fourth amendment doctrine expanded during the prohibition era. The
first treatise on the subject appeared in 1926 when Asher Cornelius published his 925 page
Law of Search and Seizure. Just four years later, he published a second edition of 1265 pages; in
explaining the need for the new edition, he called attention to the "[h]undreds of new ques-
tions [that] have been presented to the courts for solution" since the preparation of the manu-
script for the first edition. He claimed that the revised version incorporated "fifty late
decisions by the United States Supreme Court, in which search and seizure are involved." A.
CORNELIus, LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE iii (2d ed. 1930).
One can detect additional evidence of the increasing complexity of fourth amendment
doctrine in the growth of the indexing system to the National Reporter System. As originally
presented in the Centuiy Edition of the American Digest, the category "Searches and Seizures" was
divided into seven "key" numbers. 43 Centug Edition of the American Digest 2803 (1903). When
the Third Decennial Digest (covering cases decided in the period 1916-1926) was published in
1929, it added thirty-nine subtopics. 24 Third Decennial Edition of the American Dig'est 1157
(1929). Thus the new digest contained more than six times as many indexing categories.
266 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924); see supra notes 81-85 and accompanying
text.
267 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); see supra notes 86-111 and accompany-
ing text.
268 Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925); see supra notes 155-69 and accompanying text.
269 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see supra notes 163-64, 176-77 and accom-
panying text.
270 Lefkowitz v. United States Attorney, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). See supra
notes 121-63 and accompanying text.
271 Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28
(1927). See supra notes 185-215 and accompanying text.
272 Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694
(1931); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S.
435 (1925); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925).
273 Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933); Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 207
(1932); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192
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Section III documents the changing trends in the Supreme Court's
treatment of five doctrinal categories during the prohibition era. Be-
cause no single trend continued throughout the period, simple charac-
terization of the body of doctrine extant in 1934 as pro-government or
pro-defendant is impossible. Different doctrinal subcategories reflect re-
strictive, ambivalent, or sympathetic approaches to the fourth amend-
ment depending on when the Court rendered the decisions.
Increasing doctrinal complexity is not the only change that oc-
curred in the search and seizure cases decided during the prohibition
era. A significant number of decisions were not easily compartmental-
ized in pre-prohibition categories.
As indicated above,2 74 the early fourth amendment cases primarily
addressed two problems: protecting an individual's home as a sanctuary
and maintaining the secrecy of papers that related to the personal or
business affairs of individuals. Historically 275 and linguistically, 276 these
concepts formed the core of the fourth amendment, and the Supreme
Court zealously protected both interests in the early twentieth century
cases. But in certain borderline cases, the Court was more tolerant of
governmental searches. It carved an early exception in customs (i.e.,
smuggling) cases, when the government was looking for contraband; it
also recognized an incident-to-arrest exception to the customary warrant
requirement, when the individual seeking protection was a person
whom the government could lawfully arrest. In addition, the Court
struggled with the vexing problem of how to fit corporations into a pro-
vision designed to make "the people" secure.
Naturally, cases involving the core concepts of house and papers277
continued to arise during the prohibition era. In cases challenging
searches of places that would obviously fall within the definition of
"houses," the Supreme Court was relatively consistent in continuing the
pre-prohibition protection of the defendant's home. From Amos to Grau,
the Court adopted a strict approach when reviewing searches of build-
ings in which individuals lived.
(1927); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505
(1925); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925). See supra notes 238-62 and accompanying
text.
274 See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
275 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 625-30 (1886); Andrews, supra note 213, at 42-46; Wood, The Scope of the Constitutional
Immuniy Against Search and Seiure, 34 W. VA. L.Q. 1, 1-10 (1927-28).
276 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in theirpersons, houser,
papers, ande.eectr, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... " (em-
phasis added).
277 Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932); Lefkowitz v. United States Attorney, 284
U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
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Nevertheless, the Court's protection of the rights of the defendant
in "house" and "papers" cases was not absolute. Dictum in Agnello, the
one drug case of the period, approved searches of houses where arrests
took place,278 and considerably less consistency is evident in cases con-
cerning seizures of papers. The latter cases can be better summarized by
reference to the general pattern of prohibition decisions.
279
More importantly, the general tendency of the prohibition cases
was not to refine doctrine within core areas but to expand the borders of
the central categories. Again and again, the Court had to provide more
precise definitions of the places and things protected by the amendment.
Did "houses" include the open fields surrounding them 280 or garages
located near them?28 ' Did telephone conversations fall within the pro-
tection afforded to "papers and effects"?2 82 Did the "effects" protected
by the amendment include liquor that the Volstead Act 283 declared was
contraband to which no property rights attached? In general, should
one appeal to the narrower approach of the smuggling cases or the
broader approach of the papers cases?
284
Applying the amendment proved particularly difficult in cases in-
volving automobiles. The warrant clause of the fourth amendment re-
quired particular description of "the place to be searched" and "the
things to be seized." Unfortunately, that language does not literally ap-
ply to an automobile search that involves the search (not merely the
seizure) of a "thing" rather than a "place." In the face of the amend-
ment's ambiguity, the Court's response was understandable, if not pre-
dictable. It improvised by jettisoning the normal warrant requirement
and applying a watered down version of fourth amendment protection.
Seen in this light, Carroll represents an important step in the evolu-
tion of fourth amendment doctrine for it presages the modem emphasis
on reasonable expectations of privacy.285 Carroll adopted the very ap-
proach that the majority in Olnstead later rejected. It dislodged fourth
amendment doctrine from its property moorings, which protected the
278 269 U.S. at 30.
279 For a discussion of the major "paper" cases, Matron, Co-Bart, and Leikowitz, see supra
notes 122-46 and accompanying text.
280 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying
text.
281 Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932). See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying
text.
282 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). See supra notes 81-111 and accompany-
ing text.
283 Ch. 85, 41 Stat. 315 (1919) (Section 25 of Title II of the Act).
284 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. Even the "papers" cases of the prohibi-
tion era tended to push at the boundary because they were invariably connected with the
management of an illegal enterprise.
285 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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house as sanctuary and papers as things free from government scrutiny,
and reconceptualized the interest protected by the fourth amendment.
The defendant lost the procedural protection afforded by the customary
warrant requirement that interposed a neutral magistrate in the process.
At the same time, the redefined right was made broader because what
was being protected was not a particular place or thing but the desire of
"persons lawfully using the highways" to avoid "the inconvenience and
indignity" of having their automobiles searched for no particular
reason.2
86
Carroll's reformulation of fourth amendment rights provides a no-
ticeable shift in emphasis from the pre-prohibition cases. Rather than
focusing upon property rights, the Court began to recognize a more gen-
eralized (and less absolute) right to privacy as the interest deserving pro-
tection. A few other fourth amendment decisions287 as well as some
scholarly literature of the prohibition era288 described fourth amend-
ment interests in privacy terms, and the new approach provided the
seed for the modern fourth amendment emphasis on reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy.
28 9
One should not, however, attach excessive importance to this ana-
lytical shift during the prohibition era.29° The property aspects of
fourth amendment doctrine remained important in cases like Olmtead,
Ga-Bart, and Lejkowitz, decided long after Carroll. Moreover, the analyt-
ical shift does not explain the trend of prohibition cases any better than
does an attempt to view them as an uninterrupted continuation of
themes established in pre-prohibition cases. As the preceding section
shows, all the boundary cases decided during the prohibition era tend to
follow a zig-zag pattern that crossed both analytical categories and
background circumstances. The early cases consistently favored the
government and restricted the reach of the fourth amendment. The de-
cisions in the middle years reflected divided sentiments that permitted
the reversal of some convictions, but only for relatively casual offenders.
In *the final years, the Court's opinions revived the rule of liberal con-
struction and used the amendment to protect serious offenders as well.
286 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
287 E.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). The most consistent expo-
nent of the privacy rationale was Justice Brandeis. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
288 Eg., Atkinson, Prohikition and the Docnrze of the Weeks Case, 23 MICH. L. Rav. 748, 757-
59 (1925); Wood, supra note 275, at 137.
289 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).





The foregoing summary of fourth amendment doctrine during the
prohibition era raises the question of the role prohibition played in the
course of fourth amendment doctrinal development.
At a minimum, the prohibition era provided the catalyst for the
development of more complex fourth amendment doctrines. The sheer
volume of the prohibition cases and the accompanying growth in doctri-
nal complexity supports this conclusion. Indeed, scholarly analyses of
fourth amendment doctrine during the prohibition era routinely ac-
knowledged "the rapid development of the subject under
prohibition."
29 1
The recognition that much fourth amendment doctrine developed
during the prohibition era provides a historical framework from which
to view modern fourth amendment cases. Explaining when and why the
federal courts created a unified body of fourth amendment doctrine
helps one to understand the influence of the federal law of search and
seizure in modern times. Initially, uniform application of fourth amend-
ment law was achieved when state courts voluntarily followed the
Supreme Court's example. During the 1920s, for example, a number of
states abandoned earlier precedents to the contrary and adopted the ex-
clusionary rule as a rule of state law. 292 Ultimately, however, the
Supreme Court required states to follow the federal rule when Mapp v.
Ohio293 held that the exclusionary rule was binding on the states. Al-
though Mapp came after prohibition was repealed, the prohibition de-
velopments were an important preparatory step. By establishing and
refining most of the modem categories, the federal standards established
in the prohibition cases provided a benchmark against which state rules
could be measured. Without such a development, the ultimate federali-
zation almost certainly would have been delayed. The Court probably
would have hesitated to impose a requirement that had never been re-
fined through federal litigation. Moreover, even if a general require-
291 Fraenkel, supra note 213, at 1. See also Atkinson, supra note 288, at 748-49; Carroll, The
Search and Seizure Provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions, 10 VA. L. REV. 124 (1923);
Roberts, Does the Search and Seizure Clause Hinder the Proper Administration ofthe CrinalJustice?, 5
Wis. L. REv. 195 (1929).
A student commentator even tried to quantify the explosion that prohibition had pro-
duced in the number of reported cases. According to his count of cases in the American Digest,
"more than 700 cases involving the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence [had been]
reported" since the Volstead Act went into effect, and approximately 575 of the cases had
involved prosecutions for violations of liquor laws. Moreover, the number of cases was still
growing when he published his account in the Yale Law Journal in 1927; on an annual basis,
"the number of liquor cases turning upon the rule had increased from four, during the first
year, to more than 220 during the past year." Comment, sura note 189, at 537 n.2.
292 See supra note 213.
293 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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ment had been imposed, state courts unsympathetic to the federal rule
could easily have frustrated its implementation while the Supreme
Court spent years refining the general concepts.
Recognizing prohibition as the impetus for the development of
fourth amendment doctrine is significant in another respect. It suggesti
that those interested in understanding modem doctrine should give seri-
ous attention to the prohibition cases. Since categories and distinctions
developed in prohibition cases form the basis for the modern law of
search and seizure, understanding these cases should help one appreci-
ate the basic themes and tensions of fourth amendment doctrine.
The evidence, however, justifies going beyond the initial recogni-
tion of prohibition as a catalyst. It is important to understand that
changing attitudes toward prohibition and prohibition enforcement had
a substantive role in the development of fourth amendment doctrine.
Whether the prohibition cases are considered as a whole, or within their
traditional doctrinal subcategories, the trend of the prohibition era deci-
sions closely mirrors the changing public attitudes toward prohibition.
The early cases strongly supported those enforcing the prohibition laws
by upholding the validity of searches against fourth amendment chal-
lenges. The decisions in the middle years reflected incipient doubts
about some of the techniques of prohibition enforcement, while gener-
ally affirming convictions of serious violators. Finally, after 1930, the
Court rediscovered the need for a liberal interpretation of fourth
amendment rights and became increasingly strict in construing excep-
tions to fourth amendment protections.
Although no prohibition era commentator sketched the process de-
scribed above in full, some recognized the prohibition's influence on the
initial abandonment of the rule of liberal construction. Even before the
first major group of Supreme Court opinions, an article in the Central
Law Journal encouraged the Court to construe the eighteenth amend-
ment as implicitly repealing the fourth amendment in liquor cases.
294
Although the author conceded that this approach would eliminate some
safeguards in prohibition cases, 295 he argued that decreased protection
in prohibition cases was necessary to avoid the even greater danger that
"the host of decisions constantly arising under the Volstead Act will
serve as precedents by which the guarantees in question will be perma-
nently undermined for all purposes.
'296
The federal courts never formally embraced the implied repeal ar-
294 Johnson, Some Constitutional Aspects of Prohibition Enforcement, 97 CENT. L.J. 113, 122
(1924).
295 He argued that repeal of the fourth amendment would still leave minimum common
layd protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id at 122-23.
296 Id at 123.
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gument, 297 and most commentators did not. even discuss the prohibi-
tion's possible role in influencing the course of doctrinal development. 298
But a few observers did detect the changing emphasis of the early prohi-
bition cases. In 1927, a student noted that courts had often found the
policy of the exclusionary rule incompatible with the task of enforcing
prohibition laws. Faced with this dilemma, the courts elected to set
aside constitutional protections in order to accomplish the enforcement
goal, and "[a]s a result of this tendency, many exceptions and limita-
tions of the federal rule have arisen which had greatly narrowed the
scope that the rule was originally thought to have.
'299
The most outspoken advocate of the view that judicial decisions in
the prohibition era had restricted American liberties was Forrest Revere
Black, a law professor at the University of Kentucky. In 1930, he pub-
lished a book of essays entitled .l/-Starred Prohibition Cases, and three of
the book's nine essays attacked decisions he regarded as restricting the
individual liberty protected under the fourth amendment. 3°° The exist-
ence of a causal link between prohibition and the decline in liberties is
the implicit assumption of the entire work, but Black never defined the
exact relationship with any precision. Perhaps the best summary of his
argument is the following excerpt from the introduction to his essay on
the Carroll case:
In the last decade, the American Government has been engaged in "the
noble experiment" of enforcing constitutional prohibition. As the direct
result of this effort, it is being discovered that Bills of Rights, federal and
state, are being denaturized; certain old landmarks in the law are crum-
bling and the relation between the nation and the states is being
altered.30
1
297 But see Milam v. United States, 296 F. 629, 631 (4th Cir. 1924) ("The obligation to
enforce the Eighteenth Amendment is no less solemn than that to give effect to the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments. The Courts are therefore under the duty of deciding what is an
unreasonable search of motor cars, in light of the mandate of the Constitution that intoxicat-
ing liquors shall not be manufactured, sold, or transported for beverage purposes."); United
States v. Bateman, 278 F. 231, 233 (S.D. Cal. 1922) ('The Eighteenth Amendment must be
considered in determining the question of what is an unreasonable search and seizure as pre-
scribed by the Fourth Amendment. If there were no Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion to be enforced, the court might have an entirely different idea of what is an unreasonable
search or seizure as disclosed in this case.").
298 See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 288, at 749: "The Eighteenth Amendment prohibits the
manufacture, transportation and sale of liquor. Does this mean that in the case that other
provisions of the Constitution come in the way of efficient enforcement of the prohibition
amendment, they must fall so far as liquor offenses are concerned? Clearly not. . . . As a
matter of fact, it seems too clear for argument that the Eighteenth Amendment is merely an
enlargement of the federal power to deal with liquor offenses and was never intended to alter
in any way the constitutional safeguards and personal guarantees."
299 Comment, supra note 189, at 537 (footnotes omitted).
300 F. BLAcK, supra note 30, chs. I, III, VII.
301 Id at 15.
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Even those contemporary observers who suggested that prohibition
exerted an influence on the direction of fourth amendment decisions no-
ticed only part of the process, the retreat from the rule of liberal con-
struction in earlier cases. The obvious reason for this inattention to later
developments is the date of the writings, for the commentaries stressing
the link between prohibition and the trend of judicial opinions appeared
before the final shift in approach of the cases during the last years of
prohibition.
The repeal of prohibition within a very few years after the appear-
ance of the new approach offers a plausible explanation for the lack of
scholarly attention to the later cases.302 If search and seizure issues were
merely symptoms of a broader "prohibition" problem, one should not
find it surprising that scholars ignored the symptoms once the signifi-
cance of the underlying problem diminished in the face of far greater
concern over the depression.
Accepting prohibition as one of the causal factors in the develop-
ment of fourth amendment doctrine is significant for two reasons. First,
it helps the modem lawyer understand the non-harmonious character of
the law of search and seizure, and suggests a method or approach for
contemporary scholarship in this area. The basic fourth amendment
categories were created at a time of shifting attitudes toward the sub-
stantive goals that prohibition searches were designed to further. Differ-
ent categories thus reflected commitments to differing interests
depending on the time period in which the decisions defining the partic-
ular category were rendered. As a result, any attempt to justify and
reconcile all of the prohibition cases from the perspective of a single
definition of the value to be protected by the amendment seems doomed
to failure. Modem scholars would do well, therefore, to take an explic-
itly normative approach to the fourth amendment decisions. The con-
temporary commentator should study the decisions to determine which
ones reflect a set of value preferences that he or she is willing to support
and defend. Then the commentator should identify the tenets of con-
temporary doctrine which conflict with those value preferences and out-
line how judicial acceptance of the chosen value would remold the
entire doctrinal corpus.
Understanding prohibition's causative influence on the develop-
ment of fourth amendment doctrines should also affect the way modem
302 An additional explanation for the lack of critical literature with respect to the later
cases may He in the nature of the subsequent decisions. They seem less drastic. Rather than
carving out new subcategories, they tend to refine, limit, and apply qualifications that had
been created in the earlier decisions. Thus, these developments might have seemed to con-
tempararies to lie more completely within an autonomous zone of legal concepts than did the
earlier prohibition cases, which boldly created new doctrinal categories.
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courts interpret those doctrines. To the extent that a movement long
since gone from the American political scene influenced the underlying
character of current doctrines, courts should be willing to reconsider the
basic premises on which those doctrines are based. Occasionally, the
Supreme Court has shown such willingness as, for example, in Katz v.
United States 303 when it overruled Olnstead to hold that modern technol-
ogy required that wiretaps be treated as searches under the fourth
amendment. But more frequently, modern decisions have simply re-
fined and modified prohibition era categories such as automobile
searches30 4 and searches incident-to-arresta
0 5
The most obvious candidate for a complete reappraisal is the ex-
ception to the warrant requirement for automobile searches, which Car-
roll created at the beginning of the prohibition era. As early as 1927, the
Court recognized the doctrine's potential for abuse and began to em-
phasize probable cause as a requirement for the warrantless searches.
3 0 6
As a result of the general, but incomplete,3 0 7 adherence to the probable
cause requirement in recent decisions, the automobile exception has be-
come a confusing morass. Police officers face potential frustration when
they wish to use the automobile search as the basis for a prosecution, but
it still provides significant opportunities for police harassment.
Once one acknowledges the inadequacy of the conceptual frame-
work of the prohibition era, the way out of the confusion is clear. The
exception to the warrant requirement should depend upon the circum-
stances surrounding the search rather than the character of the thing to
be searched. If adequate protection of society requires a search, and
obtaining a warrant is not feasible, a warrantless search of an automo-
bile or anything else is reasonable and constitutional. On the other
hand, if obtaining a warrant would not preclude satisfactory enforce-
ment of the law, or a warrantless search would unduly restrict an indi-
vidual's reasonable expectation of privacy, a warrantless search of an
automobile or anything else is impermissible. Of course, difficult factual
situations would continue to arise, but the hard cases could be addressed
in the context of a test consistent with the general principles of modern
fourth amendment doctrine.
303 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
304 See cases cited supra note 155, and inffra 307.
305 Eg., New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
306 Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927). See supra notes 165-67, 200-06 and
accompanying text.
307 ee cases cited sura note 155; see also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976);
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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Accepting prohibition as one causal element also has importance
with respect to the history of American legal thought. Without retreat-
ing to a consensual view of American history, it cautions against an ex-
clusively economic interpretation of the forces behind the growth of
legal rules and doctrines. Prohibition was an historical epoch character-
ized by conflict, but the conflicting values of the era cannot be easily
explained in purely economic terms nor can they be dismissed as irra-
tional. As Joseph Gusfield has persuasively argued, prohibition was an
incident in a broader conflict over symbolic values intimately associated
with the status of various groups in American society.3
08
This article documents how the prohibition conflict exerted an in-
fluence over the law's development in one area of criminal procedure,
the law of search and seizure. Furthermore, evidence supports the belief
that the conflict over prohibition affected other areas of criminal law.30 9
One can even persuasively argue that prohibition was not just an
influence but was rather the primary influence in the development of
fourth amendment doctrine. The obvious danger of such an argument
is reductionism rather than timidity of interpretation. To counteract
that tendency three possible misinterpretations should be anticipated
and disavowed. First, the primary cause formulation makes no claim as
to the specific causes of particular decisions, for other factors undoubt-
edly assumed importance in individual cases. Instead, what is offered is
an explanation of the direction, the trend, the drift of the decisions as a
whole.310 Second, the formulation makes no attempt to deny the reality
of multiple causation. Other factors (e.g., the existence of the fourth
amendment, prior decisions, and the background of the justices) surely
exerted influence on the decisional trend. Nevertheless, the claim ad-
vanced here asserts that none of these was as significant as prohibition in
prompting the general trend of the decisions. Third, the primary cause
308 J. GusFrELD, supra note 2,passim.
309 E.g., Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933) (defendant's wife competent to testify
in his behalf); Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (defense of entrapment recog-
nized); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926) (double jeopardy not applicable to separate
prosecutions by state and federal governments); Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926)
(defendant's decision to testify in his own behalf a complete waiver of his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (double
jeopardy inapplicable to separate prosecutions by state and federal governments). See also
Murchison, sujira note 11, Oassim (defense of entrapment).
310 Cf. L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYsTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 143 (1975)
("Some form of social theory, then, must occupy a central place in the theory of law....
Roscoe Pound strongly attacked the 'economic interpretation.' The 'taught tradition of law,'
he felt, rather than class interests, explained thefparticular decision. Yet Pound admitted that
in the long run, the economic prevailed. ... We can concede with Pound that 'legal tradi-
tion' may best explain some particular decision, but rarely a trend or drift.") (emphasis in
original). S&e a/so Murchison, Book Review, 19 A.F.L. REv. 421, 423-24 (1978).
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formulation makes no attempt to quantify the precise scope of the
causal relationship. As a result, one simply does not know what fourth
amendment doctrine would have been like had America not instituted
the "noble experiment" of prohibition.
The preceding sections have marshalled evidence for the claim that
prohibition was the primary cause of that era's fourth amendment de-
velopments. Two aspects of the evidence-the three shifts in attitude
discernible in the prohibition decisions and the degree to which the gen-
eral pattern manifests itself in all aspects of the doctrinal structure-
deserve special emphasis.
As related above, the Supreme Court's approach to fourth amend-
ment problems shifted three times during the prohibition era. First the
Court moved from a liberal construction of fourth amendment rights in
the pre-prohibition cases to a strict construction in the early prohibition
cases. Next came the ambivalence of the middle years. Then, finally,
the cases at the end of the prohibition era rediscovered the rule of liberal
construction. These shifts in approach support the description of prohi-
bition as primary cause in two respects. First, multiple levels of correla-
tion between changing public attitudes toward prohibition and the
trend of the fourth amendment decisions decreases the likelihood that
the phenomenon can be dismissed as mere coincidence. Second, the er-
ratic course of fourth amendment decisions makes them difficult to ex-
plain by reference to other factors that do not display a similarly erratic
course.
The degree to which the general trend reappears in many subcat-
egories of the doctrinal structure furnishes additional justification for the
claim of primacy. The consistency with which the pattern is repeated
makes it more credible that the pattern offers the best general explana-
tion for the decision as a whole. At the same time, the consistency of
repetition largely eliminates the possibility that the broader pattern of
the cases was the product of some other dynamic operating within indi-
vidual subcategories.
Needless to say, the.evidence presented in Sections II, III, and IV
does not prove the causative relationship between prohibition and
fourth amendment developments in a logical or statistical sense. It sim-
ply supports a judgment that the prohibition backdrop provides a relia-
ble guide for understanding the fourth amendment decisions. One can,
however, support the conclusion by considering alternate explanations.
If the alternatives provide a less persuasive explanation of the decisions,
one can reasonable claim that the prohibition backdrop provides a more




One alternative that must be considered is the possibility that the
course of the decisions can be explained by reference to precedent or
autonomous legal reasoning. The cases discussed above illustrate that
such an explanation is unsatisfactory. On too many occasions, the
Court reached different results in similar cases. Sometimes it achieved
its objective by expanding doctrinal categories and exceptions. Weeks,
for example, allowed the use of evidence seized by state officials in a
search conducted immediately before a search by federal officials, but
Byars excluded all evidence seized in a search where the federal official
participated in his federal capacity. Marron allowed the introduction of
a ledger and bills as instrumentalities of a crime, while Lekowitz applied
the ban on the seizure of "mere" evidence to exclude very similar
records. On other occasions, the application of rules shifted noticeably
even when the rules themselves remained constant. Comparison of the
facts known to the officers in Carroll and Gambino offers a good example
of this form of indeterminancy within the system of legal concepts.
Legal training and tradition do appear to have influenced one as-
pect of the fourth amendment decisions-the Court's reluctance to over-
rule prior decisions. The Court was willing to manipulate doctrinal
categories and to apply rules differently, but in no instance did the
Court explicitly overrule a prior precedent. 311 That limited influence on
the way lawyers (or, at least, Supreme Court justices) reason does not
change the basic point, however. Reference to prohibition provides a
better guide to the trend of the decisions as a whole than do the profes-
sional techniques of analysis used by lawyers.
Another possible explanation of the prohibition cases would de-
scribe the changing pattern of decisions as produced by a change in the
Court's analytic approach, 312 but this hypothesis is ultimately unpersua-
sive. As Section IV of the article indicates,313 some of the prohibition
cases did tend to deemphasize the property element of fourth amend-
ment doctrine, but this shift in emphasis does not provide a reliable
guide to ujderstanding the trend of the decisions. The most obvious
inadequacy is the argument's inability to account for more than one
change in the Court's approach to fourth amendment questions. In fact,
the initial shift to a restrictive interpretation was reversed in the deci-
sions rendered at the end of the prohibition era. Furthermore, although
the prohibition cases relentlessly pushed at the property moorings of
fourth amendment doctrine, the Court never completely abandoned the
property focus. Indeed, it vigorously reiterated the property aspects in
311 The automobile cases provide the most graphic illustration of this reluctance to over-
rule. See supra notes 152-84 and accompanying text.
312 Se gneraly Note, .upra note 62.
313 Se supra notes 281-89 and accompanying text.
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several opinions handed down in the middle or later years of
prohibition.
A third possible way to explain a changing pattern of decisions
would look for dramatic changes in the make-up of the Supreme Court,
but no such changes occurred during the prohibition era. The Court
was extremely stable throughout the era, especially after 1924 when the
first group of restrictive fourth amendment decisions was handed down.
Three justices served during the entire 1920-1933 period, 314 and a clear
majority of the Court served throughout the three shifts in approach
that the opinions reflect.315 Moreover, most of the prohibition decisions
were unanimous, including those at the beginning and end of the era
when the contrast in approaches was most vivid.316 Justices who au-
thored or concurred in the early opinions were not outvoted in the last
cases; they authored or concurred in the new opinions as well.3 17 In
short, the contrast with the doctrinal changes concerning congressional
power that came a few years later 318 could not be more vivid. The fac-
tor that issued the ultimate triumph of an expanded vision of the Com-
merce Clause was Roosevelt's appointment of five justices between 1937
and 1941.319 To the contrary, during the prohibition era, members of
the Court merely changed their positions; they were neither replaced
nor outvoted.
Some significance could be attached to one change in the Court's
make-up, Charles Evans Hughes' replacement of William Howard Taft
as Chief Justice in 1930. Although both men opposed the adoption of
the eighteenth amendment, their personal responses to prohibition dif-
fered greatly.320 Once the prohibition amendment became law, Taft
vigorously supported it and became a teetotaler; Hughes, by contrast,
314 The three were Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Brandeis. W. SWINDLER, supra note
184, at 317-18.
315 In addition to the three who served throughout the prohibition era, Sutherland and
Butler remained on the Court from 1922 to the end of the era. Furthermore, Stone joined the
Court in 1925 and was still an associate justice when the eighteenth amendment was repealed.
Id at 319-20.
316 Of the seventeen prohibition era decisions discussed in the text, dissents were filed in
only three cases, O/mstead, Carroll, and Sgro. The dissent in the first two cases encouraged a
pro-defendant stance, while the Sgro dissent would have been more favorable to the govern-
ment. Nonetheless, Justice Brandeis sided with the dissenters in all three cases.
317 Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of this change can be seen in Justice Butler's au-
thorship of unanimous opinions in both Marron and Go-Bart. See supra notes 122-36 and ac-
companying text.
318 See genemal4 W. SWINDLER, suspra note 184, at 28-100; Stem, The Commerce Clause and the
National Economy, 1933-1916, 59 HARv. L. REV. 883 (1946) (pt. II).
319 The seven were Justices Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Byrnes and Jack-
son. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 152 n.* (10th ed.
1980).
320 See genera/', A. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 140-46.
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never abandoned his fondness for good liquor or his willingness to satisfy
it when the occasion presented itself. Since the revival of the liberal
construction of fourth amendment rights came in cases decided after
Hughes became Chief Justice in 1930, his influence in prompting the
change should not be totally discounted. Yet accepting this argument
requires an assumption that Chief Justice Hughes had an influence over
his colleagues that he was unable to exert in other contexts.3 2' To view
the new Chief Justice's hostility to prohibition as helping to promote the
revival of the rule of liberal construction seems reasonable; to postulate
his appointment as the decisive force in shaping the course of doctrinal
development stretches thin evidence too far.
Another potential explanation for the fourth amendment decisions
during the prohibition era could focus on the importance of the individ-
ual cases, arguing that the more serious the violation, the more likely the
Court was to adopt a restrictive approach to fourth amendment rights.
Section III suggests322 that the severity of the violation does seem to
correlate with the Court's approach in the middle years of prohibition.
Furthermore, most of the restrictive decisions of the early years did in-
volve serious violations. But while the severity of the violation may help
to explain the decisions in the early and middle years of prohibition, it is
inadequate to reconcile cases that span the entire prohibition period.
Several of the decisions that favored defendants in the last years-for
example, Taylor, Go-Bart, Lejkowtz, and Sgro-involved violations of the
prohibition laws that cannot be dismissed as minor.
323
Finally, the lack of any obvious economic or behavioral justification
for the decisions of the prohibition era also reinforces the explanation of
the prohibition cases as the product of major shifts in public opinion.
The myriad exceptions and qualifications to Weeks' exclusionary rule
were clearly not designed to maximize the efficiency of enforcement
techniques, for only some favored the government. At any rate, prohibi-
tion officials vigorously protested that the restrictions under which they
operated hampered their enforcement efforts.3 24 Nor are the decisions
better explained as serving any simple behavioral objective such as con-
trolling police conduct or protecting innocent citizens from official in-
trusion into their lives. Indeed, a student commentator, who attempted
321 See G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 214-15 (1976).
322 See supira notes 105-11, 295-96 and accompanying text.
323 Taylor involved the seizure of 122 cases of whiskey, 286 U.S. at 5; the evidence obtained
in both Go-Bar, 282 U.S. at 351, and Le/kowilz, 285 U.S. at 462-63, suggested on-going busi-
nesses of soliciting and filling orders for intoxicating liquors; and the search in Sgro uncovered
a pint of gin and three and one-half barrels of beer after the information to support the search
was obtained in a prior purchase by the prohibition agent. Record at 2-3, 17, Sgro v. United
States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932).
324 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 291.
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to prepare a realist-style analysis of the decisions from the admittedly
scanty data base available, concluded that they did not accomplish
either of those objectives in practice.
3 25
Acceptance of the primary cause claim contributes to understand-
ing on two fronts. It clarifies a portion of the historical development of
American legal thought, and it enhances appreciation of the nature of
doctrinal inquiry.
As a thesis of historical development, the primary cause claim both
explains the particular incident and suggests a hypothesis for further
research. As an explanatory tool, it provides a basis for understanding a
discordant group of decisions rendered at a specific time in history. It
also suggests that prohibition was a significant influence upon other por-
tions of legal tradition and points out the need for further research to
test that hypothesis. To some degree, both the explanatory and sugges-
tive features were present in the earlier claim that prohibition was
merely a causative force. However, asserting that prohibition exerted a
primary influence, and was not merely one cause among many,
strengthens both features. It provides a better explanation for the spe-
cific historical incident, and it renders more compelling the hypothesis
that prohibition also exerted influence in other areas.
The primary cause claim also contributes to an understanding of
the nature of doctrinal inquiry, for it demonstrates the ultimately polit-
ical character of rights and liberties that the judiciary protected during
the prohibition era. Thus, the study of the development of fourth
amendment doctrine in the prohibition era illustrates, by way of a spe-
cific example, that the course of doctrinal growth is not always con-
trolled by some internal logic or some special "legal reasoning" that is
the exclusive domain of professionals. To the contrary, it suggests that
the direction of doctrinal growth is primarily determined by changing
views on underlying substantive issues. To state the matter in a crude
and reductionist way, one who was convinced that prohibition was a
noble reform and should be strictly enforced tended to contract the
reach of the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule; on the other hand,
one who became convinced that prohibition was a terrible mistake was
more likely to advocate liberal construction of fourth amendment rights.
Naturally, that crude summary does not tell a complete story. No
decisions are ever the product of any single influence, especially deci-
sions, like those of the Supreme Court, that require collegial agreement.
The existence of search and seizure precedents and the very existence of
the fourth amendment itself operated to limit the range of choices that




were entertained by, and even suggested to, the Court. For example, no
opinion urged that the government was free to search anywhere and to
seize anything it pleased or even that the government was generally free
to dispense with the need for a search warrant to search one's home. In
effect, the existence of the amendment and litigation about its meaning
tended to keep the argument at the periphery, leaving basic rights
unchallenged.
The important point is to recognize that the degree of restraint im-
posed by these traditions and precedents was indeterminate, that is,
their influence tended to expand or contract not as the result of an inter-
nal dynamic but in response to external stimuli. Once this in-
determinancy of the influence of general concepts and existing
precedents is perceived, the ultimately political nature of the judicial
process becomes clear. One simply cannot distinguish the judicial from
the political on the ground that the constitutional language and tradi-
tion play a role in the judicial process. To take the case of prohibition,
the fourth amendment exerted an impact upon the Volstead Act as well
as upon Supreme Court decisions. The Act went beyond existing
Supreme Court precedents 326 and required that affidavits for search
warrants be based on facts within the personal knowledge of the affi-
ant.327 In addition, the Act also forbade searches of purely private
dwellings unless they were being used for sales of intoxicating liquor.
328
How then can one distinguish the judicial from the political? At
least four institutional characteristics tend to give greater coherence and
continuity to general concepts and past precedents in the judicial pro-
cess than in executive or legislative functions. First, the judge's training
and role emphasize the continuity of tradition. Judges are not free to
disregard the language of the text or prior decisions as political activists
may do; they must justify their decisions by reference to a received tradi-
tion. Second, individual judicial decisions are largely immune from di-
rect challenge in electoral politics. Federal judges are appointed for life
and even in states where judges are elected, campaigns are rarely waged
on the merits of a specific decision. Third, the judicial method empha-
326 Not until the very end of the prohibition era did "athanson require that affidavits be
based on the personal knowledge of the affiant. See supra notes 261-62 & accompanying text
supra. Prior to Natanon, state authorities were split on the issue. See Note, Probable Causefor
the Issuance of Search Warrants, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 305 (1928).
327 Espionage Act, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 228 (1917). This provision was Section 5 of Title XI of
the Espionage Act, incorporated by reference into the Volstead Act. Volstead Act, ch. 85, 41
Stat. 308 (repealed 1935). See supra note 238. See also Act of November 23, 1921, Pub. L. No.
67-96, § 6,42 Stat. 222 (1921) (amendment to the Volstead Act making it a misdemeanor for
any officer of the United States to "search any private dwelling. . . without a warrant di-
recting such search" or to make a warrantless search of any other building "maliciously and
without reasonable cause.").
328 Volstead Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 315 (repealed 1935).
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sizes the element of rationality. Judges must connect the particular de-
cision to the received tradition by a process of reasoning, and the power
of the individual decision will be measured, at least in part, by the ex-
tent to which the judge is able to convince readers of the strength of the
connection. Fourth, judges (and probably all lawyers) are reluctant to
rethink old solutions. Many modern courts are more.willing to overrule
precedents than the Supreme Court was during the prohibition era, but
the predominate techniques are limitation, qualification, and exception,
rather than rejection. As a result of these institutional characteristics,
the judicial process tends to serve a conspicuously conservative political
agenda. Nonetheless, the extent of this institutional conservatism is in-
determinate, that is, courts can and do transform legal doctrine to reach
substantive goals.
If this account of the judicial process and the nature of doctrinal
change is correct, it seems to carry important implications for those who
are concerned with the protection of individual rights and liberties in
modern America. Concern for civil liberties should never lead one to
ignore the substantive proposals that require infringement of rights and
liberties if they are to be successfully implemented. The substantive
proposals themselves must be defeated in the political arena if individ-
ual rights are to be adequately protected. Neutral principles329 or an
abstract approach to judicial decision making330 may serve to help
strengthen the role that the historical conception of a right plays in in-
fluencing the decisional process. But the experience with prohibition
suggests that neither will suffice to impede the accomplishment of sub-
stantive goals indefinitely.
329 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Pniiples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
330 See Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975). For an attempt to develop a
Dworkian approach to fourth and fifth amendment issues, see Note, sufira note 62.
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